UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

John Cesario

Carol Cesario

Plaintiff’s

Vs CASE #

Stephen Bergquist

Defendant

Plaintiff’s John Cesario and Carol Cesario hereby notice their claims for relief under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 with the particularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s John Cesario and Carol Cesario are man and wife and are persons residing in the State of Rhode Island.

2. Plaintiff John Cesario, herein referred to as Plaintiff John, is a Defendant in the Superior matter of Bergquist vs Cesario PC 00-6141 and was the Petitioner in the R.I. Supreme Court matter of which direct appeals arose out of the Superior Court matter pc 00-6141

3. Plaintiff Carol Cesario, herein referred to as Plaintiff Carol, is a Plaintiff in the Family Court matter FC -00-1371 and the Petitioner in the RI Supreme Court matter.

4. Stephen Bergquist, herein called the Defendant, is the Plaintiff in Superior Court Matter PC-006141 and the Respondent in the RI Supreme Court matter.

5. The Defendant, is also a Defendant in the Family Court matter of Bergquist vs Bergquist PO -00-1371.

I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

6.      This is a separate and independent plenary action in the nature of a bill of equity available as a common law remedy under Federal law to collaterally attack Final Judgments of the R.I Superior Court dated 8-20-2001, 8-31-2001, 10-22-2001,12-10-2001, and 2-28-2002 amended to 4-15-2002, 8-22-2002 and 5-1-2004; the RI Supreme Courts affirming void orders in its opinion dated 2-9-2004 and Family Court final judgments dated 12-18-2001 and orders arising out of the court proceeding of 4-24-2004 in Family Court. Plaintiff’s state that the above orders are void for lack of procedural and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, First Amendment, Fifth Amendment and FRAUD.

7. This bill of equity arises directly under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a venerable common law remedy available to collaterally attack a final State court judgment at any time as void as wanting in due process for gross irregularities and “departures from established modes of procedure”, Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S.274, 281-282 (1876); The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Under the Law.

II. JURISDICTION

8. This Court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear a separate and independent plenary action in the nature of a bill of equity under Rhode Island common law, collaterally attacking a final Rhode Island State Court judgments as void is invoked under this Court’s Federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the substantive claims presented herein arise directly under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth, First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.226, 242 (1979). venerable common law remedy available to collaterally attack a final state court judgment at any time as void as wanting in due process for gross irregularities and “departures from established modes of procedure”, Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S.274, 281-282 (1876), as well as for deliberate acts of extrinsic fraud, fraudulent orders and orders lacking procedural and substantive due process as required by law. The Plaintiff’s appeared in Court proceedings that were a farce and mockery of Plaintiff’s procedural and substantive due process rights to notice and to a full and fair opportunity to be heard in state court. See, Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141,149(1907); Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall 223, 17 L.Ed. 531 (1864); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.327, 329-33 (1986); Welden v. United States, 70 F.3d 1,11-15(2d Cir.1995); Resolute Insurance Co. v. North Carolina, 397 F.2d 586, 589(4^th Cir.1968); Yale v National Indemnity Co., 602 F.2d 642,644-45(4^th Cir.1979); Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 287-290, 293-95 & fn.8 (6^th Cir. 1998); Williams v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 728 F.2d 730, 735(5^th Cir.1984); Fontana Empire Center v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992-95(9^th Cir.2002); Simanonok v. Simanonok, 787 F.2d 1517,1522(11^th Cir.1986), Castellano v. Fragozo, No. 00-50591 (5^th Cir. 2003).

The District Court has complete and total subject matter jurisdiction. See, Barrows v. Hutton, 99 U.S. 80, 83(1878); Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 287-295 & fn.8 (6^th Cir.1998); Simanonok v. Simanonok, 787 F.2d 1517,1522(11^t Cir. 1986, Castellano v. Fragozo, No. 00-50591 (5^th Cir. 2003). Marine Terminals, Inc., 801 F.2d 186, 188-89 (6th Cir. 1986). There, we noted that although a district court “has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings," Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, . . . [a] federal court "may entertain a collateral attack on a state court judgment which is alleged to have been procured through fraud, deception, accident, or mistake . . . ." Resolute Insurance Co. v. State of North Carolina, 397 F.2d 586, 589 (4th Cir. 1968).Sun Valley, 801 F.2d at 189. See also Lewis v. East Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 820 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1987) (due process challenge to state proceedings not barred by Feldman doctrine,. Cf. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 436 -437 [460 U.S. 462, 483] (1959) ("There can be no question as to the proper presentation of a federal claim when the highest state court passes on it. . . . We think this sufficient here to satisfy the statutory requirement that the federal right sought to be vindicated in this Court be one claimed below). The R.I Supreme Court passed on all Constitutional issues raised by the Plaintiff and affirmed orders without resolving the underlying questions such as Fourteenth Amendment protections including notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as Equal Protection Under the Law.

11. The R.I Supreme Court opinions and holdings are law in R.I. The United States

Constitution prohibits any State from passing laws or enforcing laws that are

unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Under the Law clause

guarantees the Plaintiff’s the same treatment as any other litigant. The R.I Supreme

Court’s holding in both LaMarche cases are the law in R.I. The R.I. Supreme Court had a

duty to remove the cloud of the void judgments of 8-20-2001 and 10-22-2001 and 12-10-

2001. A glance at the face of the record is all that is needed to determine whether an

order is void. However, the Plaintiff transmitted the missing transcripts.

12. The Plaintiff’s claim are of a general and specific in nature involving Federal Constitutional Fourteenth Amendment violations by the State of R.I Courts and its officers and is not a claim seeking review of the issues and controversies in the State judgments themselves. If an order is void for lack of substantive or procedural due process violations, extrinsic fraud, fraud of and by the Court itself, for the Court failing to comply with its duties both by statute and Rules of procedure, or for statutory violations which amount to violations of the Plaintiff’s inalienable rights to Equal Protection Under the Law; then the judicial proceeding is not vested with authority to hear, and or resolve through court orders, any matters before it.

STATEMENT OF CASE

12. On December 5^th 2000 Plaintiff John voluntarily entered into a mutual order with the

Defendant which mutually restrained the parties from interfering or harassing each other..

13. Plaintiff Carol had initiated a divorce from the Defendant as the Defendant was

having an affair with the neighbor and later stipulated under oath at a July 18^th 2001

hearing that the neighbor was the cause of the breakup of the marriage.

R.I Superior Court

5-31-2004

14. Plaintiff John appeared in Superior Court in response to a witness subpoena served

upon him. Plaintiff John did not receive a motion to adjudge him in indirect contempt,

nor was any motion certified, docketed or filed with the court. EXHIBIT A

TRANSCRIPT 5-31-2001. The hearing was void as it violated the Plaintiff’s rights

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, as to notice. Had the Plaintiff had notice he

would have been able to present a defense of unclean hands and that a simple

unthreatening phone call to the Defendant was not either harassing or interfering with the

Defendant. Plaintiff only called the Defendant because the Defendant was telling the

minors, ages 9, 5, and 2 that they were going to be murdered by the Plaintiff. The

Department of Youth and Families initiated an investigation and the Plaintiff was not

Questioned as the investigator blamed the Defendant for instilling fears in the children..

The hearing judge admonished the Defendant that his fears were inordinate.

8-20-2001

15. On August 20^th 2001 Plaintiff John appeared in the Superior Court after being

summoned by the Defendant through a witness subpoena duces tacem .

16. On August 20^th 2001 Plaintiff John obeyed the subpoena’s command and appeared in

Superior Court before Judge Fortuntao. A contempt proceeding against Plaintiff John

began. Plaintiff John did not waive any rights to due process, either substantive or

procedural. EXHIBIT B TRANSCRIPT of 8-20-2001, conclusively proves Plaintiff

John did not waive any right to due process notice. Exhibit B clearly proves Plaintiff

John was not informed of any charges at the outset of the hearing, nor was Plaintiff John

notified as to any relief requested. Attached EXHIBITC, R.I. Supreme Court Opinion

dated 2-9-2004, proves that Plaintiff John was not served in accordance with statutes, nor

was certification of service on the motion or anywhere else.

The motion for contempt presented by the Defendant was not docketed to be heard by the

clerk of the Superior Court, nor was the legally deficient motion certified as to service on

the Plaintiff. See Supreme Court opinion dated 2-9-2004. The motion was so

procedurally defective Judge Fortunato had no authority to even consider it according to

the statutes of the R.I General Assembly, the Superior Court Rules of Procedure, the R.I

Constitution Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States.

Plaintiff John clearly challenged the jurisdiction of the court to hear the contempt motion

in the appeal to the Supreme Court appeal, the RI Supreme Court found that Defendant

could not substantiate proper service to me which would give the Court authority by

statute and law to hear the contempt motion. The R.I. Supreme Court essentially passed

on entertaining the Plaintiffs claim that the order of 8-20-2001 despite clear and

unambiguous law that places a duty on the Court to remove the cloud of a void judgment,

whenever, and however it is brought to the Court’s attention.

[Fn1] Judge Fortunato was a former civil rights and ACLU attorney. There can be no doubt Judge Fortunato knew he was acting unlawfully and violating Plaintiff John Cesario’s rights by imposing an unlawful criminal contempt sentence on 8-20-2001, Cesario’s appearance was not voluntary. Fortunato’s last words to Cesario were “ you might want to get a lawyer and appeal some things”. It remains a mystery how Judge Fortunato even came to have in his possession a motion which was not docketed, filed or stamped by the Superior Court clerk. The hearing date was given to the Defendant by his filing an omnibus.

17. On August 20^th 2001, the Plaintiff John was found to be in criminal contempt of

violating the 12-5-2000 restraining order. The R.I. Supreme Court opinion of 2-9-2001

concluded Plaintiff John was held in criminal contempt based on the R.I. Supreme

Court’s annotated statutes. See Exhibit C. On 11-22-03 Judge Martin of the US R.I.

District Court determined that the contempt of 8-20-2001 was criminal contempt. EXHIBIT D

18. Plaintiff John was committed to the ACI and a criminal commitment sheet was

entered into the record. The sentence was in violation of Plaintiff’s rights to council,

rights to a jury trial as guaranteed by the R.I. Constitution, rights to notice, both

substantive and procedural, and rights against self incrimination. The crux of the

contempt motion against the Plaintiff was that he wrote belittling letters to Family Court

officials, primarily for the Family Court’s failing to address spousal and child abuse.

There was no evidence that such letters interfered with the Defendant.

19. On August 31^st 2001 Plaintiff John appeared in court based on Plaintiff’s motion

for a reduction in sentence, which was the only motion before the court on that date.

Plaintiff’s John motion to reduce sentence was granted but on a condition that the

Plaintiff was not to contact Defendants children. Plaintiff was deprived notice of the

possible entry of such an order. Said order violated Rule 65. Plaintiff John was not a

party to the divorce and did not have any restraining order against him involving

children. There was no cause shown, no hearing, or a complaint filed to make

a restraining order legally valid, in violation of Rule 65 involving injunctions and in

violation of protected by the Fourteenth amendments Equal Protection Under the Law

and Due Process clause.

20. The Plaintiff John has been further harassed and dealt with in bad faith as R.I.

Supreme Court committed extrinsic fraud in its opinion of Febuary 9^th 2004 when it then

contradicted its earlier finding when it stated that the restraining order on John Cesario

is to remain full force and effect. The R.I. Supreme Court to determined that the

purported restraining order is in full force and effect despite the record being void of a

signed order or decree There was not a signed order by a Judge in the record. Equal

Protection under the Law. The R.I. Supreme Court in its opinion declined to determine

whether Plaintiff’s due process rights were violated because the court stated that Plaintiff

may have waived my rights to notice at the hearing. An order is void based

on the face of the record. It is the duty of the Court to remove the cloud over a void order

when it is brought to the Courts attention. To assist the Supreme Court as best possible,

the Plaintiff John docketed the transcripts with his timely Motion for Rehearing. The 8-

20-2001 transcript conclusively proving that Plaintiff did not waive any rights nor were

the charges against him read in open court. Plaintiff John appeared in court as a result of

a witness subpoena duces tacem. Judges are state officers and have no authority to

operate outside of the law. Void judgments are not valid judgments at all.

21. The R.I. Supreme Court opinions are law in R.I. The State of R.I is prohibited from

passing laws or enforcing laws that are repugnant to the United States Constitution. The

R.I. Supreme Court is bound by the laws of the R.I. General Assembly and the Rules and

Procedures of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Law of the Land. .

22. The R.I. Supreme Court stated in its opinion that the hearing justice designated the

hearing of 8-20-2001 was designated civil by the hearing justice. This is a fraud. The

transcript of 8-20-2001 does not mention the word civil throughout the entire proceeding.

23. The R. I. Supreme Court statements as it relates to the 8-31-2001 hearing its finding

that the hearing of 8-20-2001 was criminal in nature. The R.I. Supreme Court had in the

record the report of Judge Martin of United States District Court (EXHIBIT D) and

clearly referenced the case in its opinion. Further, due process in any proceeding is

dependant on reasonable notice of claims and an opportunity to be heard.

24. The R.I. Supreme Court validated the void restraining order of 8-31-2001

when it stated that the order could have been entered as an independent order or a purge

of a civil contempt. This statement is clearly fraudulent by the R.I. Supreme Court.

The record clearly shows, and the R.I. Supreme Court previously acknowledged in its

opinion, that the restraining order entered as a condition of release from the illegal

criminal sentence of 8-20-2001. Plaintiff John was never given the opportunity to purge a

contempt, Plaintiff John was denied notice as to the charges of contempt, the motion for

contempt was legally and fatally defective on its face. The R.I. Supreme Court affirmed a

restraining order which was, a condition of release from an unlawful sentence that was

vacated.

8-31-2001

25. On 8-31-2001 Judge Fortunato granted a motion to reduce sentence on the condition

that the Plaintiff was restrained and enjoined from contacting the minors.

26. On 2-9-2004 The R.I Supreme Court vacated the unlawful criminal sentence, as the

restraining order was a direct condition of that criminal sentence it should have been

vacated as it was a condition of the criminal sentence.

27. The RI Supreme Court stated the Restraining order was in full force and

effect based on the fraudulent statement that the hearing of 8-20-2001 was designated

civil and an order may have entered as a purge of a civil contempt or an independent

order. The record given to the Supreme Court, Exhibit A, does not mention the word

civil, purge, or even that the Plaintiff John was restrained and enjoined in any manner

from the minors by the hearing justice. The order is further void as that is clear fraud of

the Court.

28. Judge Fortunato did not sign any order restraining the Plaintiff and specifically stated

at the very next hearing that he did not place the restraining order on the Plaintiff, it

was done long before he entered the case. Fraud on the Court which renders a judgment

void. This court does not need to address the contradiction of the RI Supreme Court

finding the hearing of 8-20-2001 civil on one page and then criminal on another page as

the order was void from the court never having the authority to adjudicate the unserved

and unfiled contempt motion by Bergquist which was heard on 8-20-2001.

29. Rule 65 of the R.I Superior Court Rules of procedure mirrors the Federal Rule

regarding notice involving Injunctions and its subsequent Rules specifying what

constitutes a lawful contempt.

30. Plaintiff, through the proper filing of an omnibus and motions to remove and

modify restraining orders obtained a hearing date of 10-22-2001.

31. Plaintiff, after properly filing his motions, was served an invalid contempt motion by

Defendants attorney Kevin Bristow, the motion did not comport with the 10 day rule. The

Plaintiff was told by Judge Fortunato that Judge Fortunato did not place the restraining

order on the Plaintiff. Fortunato refused to hear the Plaintiff John’s Motion to Remove

the Restraining order on 10-22-2001 Fraud of the Court EXHIBIT E TRANSCRIPT

10-22-2001

October 22 2001

32. On October 22^nd 2001 Judge Fortunato refused to hear Plaintiff’s motion to remove

the restraining order. Fortunato allowed the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) to testify in

violation of a Family Court protective order and without being sworn in. Plaintiff John

invoked his Constitutional right to call witnesses as a result of the unlawful

purported restraining order placed upon him by Judge Fortunato. Judge Fortunato issued

two (2) orders on 10-22-2001, that Plaintiff pay the GAL $500.00 and that the GAL’s

motion for a protective order be granted.

Any legitimate orders from the hearing of October 22, 2001 were specific and entered as

Decrees by an attorney . EXHIBIT E

[Fn2] After the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant was telling young girls ages 9,5 and 2 that they were going to be murdered, and their mother was going to be murdered. Fortunato stated “he is their father, he can say anything he wants to them”. The transcript deleted this interchange, and on July 31^st 2002 Fortunato swore in the court reporter and asked the Plaintiff if he had any questions of her. The Plaintiff asked the court reporter a specific question as to how she could explain is missing passages, Judge Fortunato would not allow her to answer that or any other questions by Cesario.

[Fn3] Fortunato stated that equities speak through decrees, and then told the Plaintiff that he was bound by the terms of a 7 day temporary restraining order which expired nearly a year earlier. Fortunato blamed the restraining order regarding the minors on Judge Williams, although that was the TRO that Judge Williams vacated nearly a year earlier.

December 10^th 2001

33. Plaintiff appeared in Superior Court with council Kevin McKenna in defense of

a motion to hold Plaintiff John in contempt for an admonishment in the matter Bergquist

vs Cesario . The admonishment referenced the GAL. Plaintiff John’s attorney filed

objection citing that the Defendant did not have standing to bring a complaint on behalf

of a third party who was not a party to the action and that court dicta is not an order. Rule

65 specifically states that a contempt can only occur if a valid court order is violated.

[Fn4] a contempt can only occur when a clear and valid court order enters, the Defendants motion was not properly filed and no order issued on 10-22-2001.

34. Plaintiff John was held in civil contempt, jailed, and allowed to purge said contempt

by depositing $5000.00 in the registry of the court and making a sworn statement to stay

out of the Family Court proceedings. SEE EXHIBIT F DEFECTIVE MOTION TO

ADJUDGE CESARIO IN CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATING A PURPORTED

ADMONISHMENT.

35. Fortunato found Cesario in contempt of court on December 10^th 2001. This action

taken by Judge Fortunato on December 10^th 2001 was void on its face, there is no statute

in R.I. allows for a court to adjudge a person in contempt for violating an admonishment.

Equal Protection Under the Law

36. In searching annotated statutes diligently to be thorough prior to accusing the State of

RI for adjudging the Plaintiff John in contempt for violating a purported admonishment,

the Plaintiff contacted a Westlaw representative for assistance. That representative from

Westlaw informed Plaintiff that the old Soviet Union may have case law to support a

finding of contempt for an admonishment, because he could not find any such holding in

a search of the United States.

37. If there is no law for the Court to exert jurisdiction in support of adjudging the

Plaintiff in contempt for violating an admonishment, the order is void. The Plaintiff was

not notified or given the opportunity to be heard regarding the entry, or more

appropriately a NON ENTRY, of a PURPORTED admonishment, when there is no law

passed by the General Assembly, or annotated Statutes claiming such a law exists.

In addition to violating due process rights of the Plaintiff, the Court violated the

Plaintiff’s Rights to Equal Protection Under the Law and committed extrinsic fraud in

attempting to make up a law. The orders of December 10^th 2001 are void.

38. If the hearing of December 10^th 2001 is void, and its subsequent order void, then

The Defendant had no basis to bring a contempt motion against Plaintiff for sending

a Disciplinary Complaint regarding Plaintiff’s attorney Rioles participation in witness

tampering in the Superior Court hearing of October 22^nd 2001.

FEBUARY 28^th 2002

39. No evidence was introduced supporting Defendant’s contention that a Disciplinary

Complaint mailed to Plaintiff’s Carol’s ex attorney in a divorce which was over and had

no pending hearings scheduled, the contempt hearing adjudging the Plaintiff John’s in

contempt on Febuary 28^th 2002 hearing is void as the grounds for such a motion was void

ab initio based on the October 22^nd 2001 hearing. A void cannot support a void, and a

fraud cannot support a fraud.

[Fn5] Contempt of an admonishment which never occurred is not a violation of a lawful court order. Rule 65

40.The Defendant presented an order which fraudulently states that on Febuary 28^th 2002

that Plaintiff John was restrained and enjoined from contacting the minors. The transcript

does not reflect any order entering. There was no prayer for such relief in the motion for

contempt, or any other notice. The order was arbitrary, and without adherence to the

rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment including right to notice and an

opportunity to be heard. In addition, the order was a fraud perpetrated on the Court by the

Defendant and knowingly signed by Judge Fortunato. Of course, the RI Supreme Court

refused to address any claims of due process violations and fraud. The RI Supreme Court

clearly committed treason against the Constitution in all of the above hearings in which

they gave validity to void orders. EXHIBIT G TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING OF

FEBUARY 28^th 2002

41. The R.I. Supreme Court validated an unlawful, unsigned, void restraining order by

affirming the 8-31-2001 order was valid despite the R.I. Supreme Court’s knowledge that

the restraining order was a condition of release of a criminal sentence which was vacated.

The hearing justice denied placing the order on 10-22-2001’

* hearing of 8-20-2001 was void

* hearing of 8-20-2001 was not designated civil as was fraudulently represented

* restraining order was not a purge of a civil contempt or independent order

* restraining order was clearly a condition of release from a criminal sentence

* criminal sentence was vacated, so should the sanctions

The R.I Supreme Court was in possession of the missing transcript dated 8-22-2001 in

which the Plaintiff motioned the court for a hearing to remove the said restraining order

Judge Fortunato placed on the Plaintiff on 8-31-2001. EXHIBIT E Judge Fortunato

denying placing the restraining order on Plaintiff’s John pg 17, 24-25

Motion to adjudge The Plaintiff in contempt which the hearing concluded on

Febuary 28^th 2002 (EXHIBIT G) didn’t contain any prayer for relief or give the Plaintiff

any notice that would afford the opportunity to oppose such an order, it therefore is a

void order based on fraud, lack of notice and lack of opportunity to be heard.

42. The R.I Supreme Court did not address or substantiate any of its findings in affirming

these void and fraudulent orders through common law doctrines such as laws passed by

the General Assembly, the laws passed by the R.I Superior Court Rules of Procedure, or

any annotated statutes which would support their affirming the opinion by the R.I

Supreme Court. The US District Court only addresses jurisdictional issues to the extent

they applied to judicial immunity in the Plaintiff’s Federal Lawsuit CA No -02 -289 S.

[Fn6] The Plaintiffs USC 1983 action against the State was dismissed on summary judgment for failure to State a Claim. The State of R.I consents to suit as a person in Legislation passed by the R.I General Assembly § 9-31-1  Tort liability of state. – (a) The state of Rhode Island and any political subdivision thereof, including all cities and towns, shall, subject to the period of limitations set forth in § 9-1-25, hereby be liable in all actions of tort in the same manner as a private individual or corporation; provided, however, that any recovery in any such action shall not exceed the monetary limitations thereof set forth in this chapter.

   (b) Except as otherwise provided herein, neither the State nor any other public body of the State of Rhode Island shall have any liability for any claim arising prior to December 31, 2002, from the failure of a computer, software program, database, network, information system, firmware, embedded chip, or any other device, whether operated by or on behalf of the State of Rhode Island or one of its agencies, departments, divisions, or any public body as defined in § 9-1-31.1(a)(1), to interpret, produce, calculate, generate, or account for a date(s) or time(s) which date(s) or time(s) is associated with the year 2000 date change. This provision of this section shall apply without limitation to cities, towns, school committees, regional school committees, housing authorities, public libraries, sewer district, water districts, fire districts, agencies, authorities, boards, committees, subcommittees, councils and commissions. Provided that nothing herein contained shall exempt any public body from liability:

   (1) For acts or omissions not in good faith, or

   (2) For any malicious, willful, wanton, reckless or grossly negligent acts or omissions.    Provided that the public entity will only be liable for the proportion of damages attributable to its own degree of fault, and provided further that any such liability shall be governed by the monetary limitations of this chapter.

[Fn7] The Plaintiff’s USC 1983 action against the Guardian Ad Litem PATRICIA MURRAY RAPOZA for threatening a Plaintiff Carol Cesario that if she appeared in Superior Court as a witness she would file an emergency motion to have her children taken away was dismissed with prejudice without a witness, hearing or evidence presented on procedural technicality because the Plaintiff’s were a few days late in objecting to a motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff Carol was so afraid she did not appear in Superior Court even though she was subpoenaed to appear and was a material witness. After Plaintiff John filed witness coercion motions Carol was intimidated and threatened to place a restraining order on John by her own attorney. The restraining order was not a no contact order and essentially was to keep John out of the divorce. There was not one divorce hearing allowed by Judge Bedrosian after 9-17-2001 however. Plaintiff John was never involved in divorce. The witness tampering occurred in Superior Court.

On 10-25 -2001 John Cesario appeared before Judge Fortunato to report witness tampering by the GAL PATRICIA MURRAY RAPOZA and a present a tape recorded conversation as evidence, Judge Fortunato told Cesario “this will come back to haunt you”.

The District Court found the Plaintiff’s civil right 1983 complaint disjointed, they were correct. The Plaintiff’s believe their complaint stated Constitutional claims that relief could be granted.

43. The R.I Supreme Court has essentially passed on determining the Claims of

procedural due process, substantive due process, equal protection under the law, First

Amendment Right Violations and Fourteenth Amendment Violations regarding the State

Superior Court is vested with the authority to protect, yet violated in multiple hearings.

44. Even after receiving the missing transcripts from the Plaintiff the Supreme

Court did not support any findings or review the Constitutional claims asserted by

Plaintiff John in his appeal, which in itself shows a willing disregard to perform its lawful

duties and provide the Plaintiff with Equal Protection Under the Law.

45. On May 1^st 2004 Superior Court Judge Procaccini denied the Defendants motion to

adjudge The Plaintiff in contempt for violating the restraining order regarding the

children, making a finding of fact that the order was not credible. This decision came

within weeks of the Supreme Court affirming its opinion for the second time regarding

the 2-9-2004 Supreme Court opinion. The R.I Supreme Court refuses to address the

Constitutional violations argued in Plaintiff’s complaint. EXHIBIT H TRANSCRIPT

OF HEARING DATED 5-1-2004.

46. The Supreme Court opinions of R.I. are law, and must be followed by lower courts

whether lower court judges agree or disagree with the decisions of the R.I. Supreme .

Court decisions URI VS Department of Labor

47. Judge Procaccini, sua sponte, issued a restraining order on Plaintiff John from pro se

pleadings in the matter of Bergquist vs Cesario PC 00-6141 on May 1^st 2004, not only in

violation of the Plaintiff’s due process rights as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment

as to notice and opportunity to be heard. It is another void order, and Plaintiff John

states that he is a Defendant in that matter and the waiver of his rights to represent

himself cannot be waived and is in conflict with annotated statutes.

[Fn8] Judges Fortunato and Vogel previously attempted to restrain the Plaintiff’s pro se appearances. Judge Procaccini stated at the beginning of the May 5^th 2004 hearing that the parties were in court on three motions, cross contempt complaints and a motion to quash. Plaintiff had previously presented Judge Procaccini with memoranda of law regarding the law in regard with attempting to restrain pro se appearances of a defendant, and the due process requirements. The record reveals that the Plaintiff wants to be heard on the matter.

48. Judge Procaccini and Plaintiff John agreed to pass a hearing on pro se restrictions at

the outset of the trial, April 1^st 2004, until the contempt issues were resolved. To add

an order sua sponte without notice or an opportunity to be heard is fraud and nullifies the

agreement Plaintiff John’s and Judge Procaccini entered into at the outset of the hearing.

49. Given that Judge Procaccini was not responsible for the void orders of Fortunato and

the dereliction of duty and deprivation of rights the RI Supreme Court caused the

Plaintiff John, it is understandable that Judge Procaccini did not want to hear anymore,

but his bench decision finding the restraining orders on the Plaintiff John from contacting

the minors as not credible, has led to more controversy. An order is either a valid or not, a

valid judgment can be erroneous and overturned on appeal but a void order is one which

the Court did not have authority to enter the order.

50. On August 22^nd 2002 Plaintiff appeared in Superior Court before Judge Vogel

based on a motion to adjudge the Plaintiff in contempt. Said motion was legally

deficient according to the Rules of Procedure which a Superior Court judge operating

without a jury must abide by according to the laws of R.I. passed by the General

Assembly of R.I. The Court sua sponte, reversed a decision of contempt and found

Plaintiff John in violation of Rule 11. Further violating the rights of the Plaintiff

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection under the Law. Plaintiff

John was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard. The motion by the Defendant set

an original court date of 7-11-2002, and was certified as mailed to the Plaintiff by the

Defendants attorney on 7-10-2002. No omnibus was filed. Plaintiff sought to recuse

Judge Fortunato on 7-11-2002. EXHIBIT I DEFECTIVE MOTION. Plaintiff John’s

motions were validly before the Court but the Court would not hear them.

[Fn9] The Defendants motion before Judge Vogel on 8-21-2002 was a nullity, Judge Vogel refused to hear the Plaintiffs valid motions. On 8-21-2002 Judge Vogel found the Plaintiff in contempt for filing pro se motions despite Judge Fortunato refusing to sign is unlawful order. On 8-22-2002 the Plaintiff was to be sentenced, Judge Vogel “had a stream of conscience” and vacated the contempt finding of a day earlier, she then sua sponte, without notice or giving the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard, found the Plaintiff guilty of a Rule 11 violation. Judge Vogel was put in an awkward situation. While not agreeing legally with Judges Procaccini, McGuirl, these judges seemed to have empathy for the Plaintiff’s at the end of the hearings. Judge Hurst, who presided over one hearing, spent the majority of the hearing telling John D Lynch’s daughter to have the attorneys at Lynch and Friel read the rule books because of all the mistakes they made.

R.I. FAMILY COURT

51. On March 24^th 2004 Plaintiff Carol appeared in Family Court based on several of her

motions and a motion filed by the Defendant charging her with contempt for allowing her

husband, Plaintiff John, for his being in the presence of the children. Their was not a

VALID order in Family Court in restraining the Plaintiff Carol from having Plaintiff John

in the presence of the children.

52. Plaintiff Carol was not found to be in contempt of any restraining order issued by

Family Court. Judge Mutter found that Plaintiff Carol was assisting Plaintiff John in

violating a Superior Court order affirmed by the R.I Supreme Court. Mutter found

Plaintiff Carol be an unfit and restrained the Plaintiff from having my husband in the

presence of the children. He also ordered that the children’s placement be changed to the

Defendant. Plaintiff’s rights were violated as their was no valid motion filed, no valid and

lawful service of a motion filed, their was not a motion for a change of placement on the

court docket to be heard on March 24^th 2004, yet Judge Mutter issued the order as an add

on at the end of the hearing and fled the courtroom.

[Fn10] The Defendant had filed a contempt motion a month for nearly a year and a half seeking the Plaintiff be jailed and lose placement of the children. The Defendant didn’t prosecute these motions as they were baseless. Said motions were abuse of process and intimidating considering that Plaintiff Carol saw the complete lawlessness in Superior Court which occurred to John. The Family Court allowed these abuses as well as allowed attorney Lynch to blatantly lie to the court and repeatedly enter erroneous and fraudulent orders. Family Court also took no action against the GAL, PATRICIA MURRAYY RAPOZA for switching her report and violating protective order three {3} times. The R.I Attorney General was unable to EVEN have the court docket in the Bergquist matter certified by the Family Court clerk. The only conceivable reason why a Family Court clerk would not certify the docket is because it was altered.

Attorney John D. Lynch was previously sanctioned for improperly loaning money to a Family Court judge he frequently appeared before.

53. The Family Court Judge Mutter did not have any jurisdiction over Superior Court

matters. Plaintiff Carol was not a party to the Superior Court matter referred to by Judge

Mutter. The Superior Court restraining order referred to by Judge Mutter was a fraud and

void but he concluded that Plaintiff Carol was helping Plaintiff John violate the void

order.

54. Judge Mutter issued the order even though there was not a valid pleading before the

Court giving notice, nor was the Plaintiff Carol afforded an opportunity to be heard

on the matter. EXHIBIT J transcript of 3-24-2004 EXHIBIT K Defendants Bergquist’s

supplemental Rule 12a pleading filed in R.I. Supreme Court.

55. On a motion for a rehearing heard on 8-25-2004 Judge Mutter addressed Plaintiff

Carol’s pleading regarding Insuffiency of service and NOTICE by stating

“Insuffiency of Notice. The motion for a change of placement was not properly before the court. The court did that sui juris based upon your testimony that you were aware that there was a Superior Court order in effect that Mr Cesario was not to be in the presence of the children. And you ma’am, said from the stand on that date not only were the children in his presence, but you wanted to introduce video’s and pictures of what a wonderful time they were all having together. And on the basis of that I found you unfit and changed the placement of the children from you to the father” EXHIBIT L partial transcript of 8-25-2004 .

[Fn11] Judge Mutter did not even attempt to mask violating Carol’s civil rights. One of Mutter’s accomplishments was producing a movie about the making of the Constitution of the United States.

56. Judge Mutter acted without jurisdiction conferred upon him by statute or the

Domestic Rules of Procedure. Plaintiff Carol cites the R.I Supreme Court’s holdings in

Lamarche vs Lamarche. This is the annotated State statute which is the controlling

law regarding void orders and lack of notice in RI. Paragraph 55 could not be any more

plain, not only is Judge Mutter, admitting that notice of a motion for change of placement

was void of procedural due process requirements, but he admitted on the record that he

entered the order sui juris, of his own will and not the will of the common law statutes

and law that a judge is bound to follow prior to his orders being valid. LaMarche

also controls the Courts duty when an order is challenged, and that is to remove the cloud

over a judgment.

57. Judge Mutter also acted in clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendments Due

Process Clause and the Equal Protection Under the Law Clause.

58. Plaintiff Carol has not been able to find any law which would allow Judge Mutter to

violate and abridge her inalienable rights to notice, an opportunity to be heard, an

opportunity to present witnesses and to act in total disregard to the laws of the State of

RI.

59. Judge Mutter admitted that he had not obtained jurisdiction through proper adherence

of statutory law when he stated the court changed placement of the children “sui juris”.

Plaintiff Carol’s rights to due process and equal protection under the law were violated

prior to any hearing on the merits. A judge acting without a jury obtains his authority to

adjudicate a matter only after strict compliance with the all Rules and Procedures of

Domestic Relations, as the laws of R.I. state.

60. Rule 62 of the Domestic Rules of Procedures state that there is an automatic stay of

orders during the pendancy of appeal, with exceptions. The exceptions do not include

change of placement and unlawful restraining orders which were issued without notice or

an opportunity to be heard. The R.I Supreme Court has not lifted the automatic stay.

61. On 2004 Judge Bedrosian of Family Court committed the act of fraud upon the

Plaintiff Carol when she stated that Rule 62 does not automatically stay judgments of the

Family Court during the pendancy of appeal. Judge Bedrosian stated that the Plaintiff

Carol had to file forms with the RI Supreme Court which was a fraudulent statement.

Rule 62 is an automatic stay Rule which is a Rule of Domestic Procedure which she has

denied Plaintiff’s rights to Equal Protection under the Law. Judge Mutter issues a

restraining order Plaintiff March 24^th 2004 without notice or an opportunity to be

heard, in violation to rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and in conflict with

Rule 65 and procedural due process notification which renders the courts decision to

enter such an order void ab initio. The Court did not have statutory power to act and

entertain the motion.

63. Judge Bedrosian, and other Family Court judges, have repeatedly denied to hear

Plaintiff’s on child support motions dating back to Febuary of 2002 despite a clear court

order of child support.

[Fn13] On July 18^th 2001 after being released from the Adult Correctional Institute for failure to pay child support and flaunting it with a note that stated “ I don’t have to pay child support” the Defendant agreed to increase his payment to $90.00 a week for three children. The Defendant has not paid a dime in child support since December of 2001, the order has not been modified, vacated or attacked and the Plaintiff has filed a half a dozen lawful motions which judges just refuse to adjudicate.

On 4-8-2002 Plaintiff Carol appeared in Family Court on her motion to vacate the stipulation of December 6^th 2001 due to attorney misrepresentation. Plaintiff subpoenaed Dr. Sporadio, The GAL Rapoza, Rioles, a DCYF case worker. Judge Bedrosian denied the motion without a hearing because Plaintiff Carol failed to add prayers in her motion. Plaintiff Carol immediately refiled a motion to vacate the Final Decree which has not been heard. Judge Bedrosian granted the GAL’s motion to quash the subpoena issued on her and stated the GAL did “yoemans work” in the case even though the Plaintiff’s motion accused the GAL of violating a protective order 3 times, unlawfully switching her report, witness tampering and failure to interview DCYF, therapists or family members prior to her report.

64. On May 11^th 2004 Judge Bedrosian the Decision Pending Final Entry be amended to

include that the child support order remain in full force and effect, the order previously

stated all orders remain in full force and effect.

65. Said order has never been enforced by the Family Court despite a plethora of motions

filed seeking to adjudge the Defendant in contempt, this is obviously one of the rare

instances in which a court does not enforce a valid child support order which was agreed

to in open court by the Defendant.

66. A fraudulent final decree was prepared by Attorney Rioles and entered in the Divorce

matter of Bergquist vs Berquist without a hearing. The Entry of Final Judgment was

fraudulently presented to the Court by Plaintiff Carol’s attorney, Brenda Rioles, who

drafted an order which fraudulently states that the Decision pending Final Entry and a

stipulation unsigned by a judge were merged and incorporated into the Final Judgment.

Wherefore a violation of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal

Protection Clause of the United States were violated. Attorney Rioles entering a

fraudulent order is Fraud on the Court. Plaintiff Carol realized the fraud on May 11^th

2004 when the matter of no hearing occurring on December 6^th 2004 was brought up in a

Family Court hearing.

67. No State salient interests are at stake in this suit. The Plaintiffs are not asking for a

review of the merits or constitutional deficiencies during a hearing, The Plaintiffs are

asking General Federal Constitutional questions as to whether their rights were protected

by the Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection under the Law were violated prior to

the Superior Court or Family Court was granted the power to act in even hearing the

matters which the void orders issued. If an order is void, because of lack of due process,

and that order is subject to collateral attack at any time in any court of competent

jurisdiction, then the District Court is not reviewing a State Courts judgment at all, it is

reviewing the Constitutional claim that the Plaintiff’s are asserting that the orders are

void. If an order is deemed void, it never had any controversy to be resolved by any

court. In Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1. The Second Circuit, 784 F.2d

1133, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986), had held that Rooker does not bar a federal court from

exercising jurisdiction over claims that certain state provisions "deny Texaco due

process and equal protection as applied. Those claims have never been presented to or

adjudicated by a state court. If an order is void no adjudication can occur. The claims by

the Plaintiff John regarding his claims that orders are void have not been adjudicated on

the merits either by the R.I Supreme Court or the R.I Superior Court. The R.I Supreme

Court did not entertain Plaintiff’s claims that the orders appealed were void, despite a

clear duty to do so under law (LaMarche).

The US Supreme Court held in Younger vs Harris 401 US 37-45 that the state judicial

system should be free to conduct its proceedings free from Federal interference, unless

when certain types of exigent circumstances exist. The matters of Superior Court case PC

00-6141 and the matter of FC -00-1371do not involve salient State interests, but they do

contain circumstances as State judge entering orders that are void, state judges entering

void orders in violation of statutes, state judges entering void orders that are fraudulent,

State judges failing to provide equal protection under the law in determining whether a

orders can even enter as a result of due process violations which render the matter before

the court a nullity, and judges failing to perform their duties and obey the law. EXIGENT

circumstances exist. The Plaintiff’s here have sought redress both in the lower courts and

the State Supreme Court, all Courts involved have failed to address the motions to vacate

orders and judgments because they are void, neither the Superior Court or the Family

Court have granted the Petitioners a hearing on the merits. The RI Supreme Court, and

the lower courts have committed fraud, affirmed fraudulent orders, affirmed a contempt

conviction based on a purported admonishment that simply is not possible because there

is no such law. Further the transcript of 10-22-2001 does not even show that

admonishment in the record.

SUPREME COURT OPINION DATED 2-9-2004

68. Failed to address or adjudicate the Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims,

from both the State and United States Constitution. The RI Supreme Court essentially

chose not to entertain the Plaintiff John’s claims or affirmed fraudulent orders..

69. Failed to address the Plaintiff John’s claim that a contempt from a purported

admonishment, even though the face of the record clearly shows the contempt motion

was void on its face, The R.I Supreme Court did not address the Plaintiff John’s claim to

notice and an opportunity to notice regarding the fraudulent restraining order signed by

Judge Fortunato from the Febuary 28^th 2002 hearing, nor did the Court even address

claims that the order was fraudulent. The R.I Supreme Court basically passed on making

determinations regarding the validity of orders that were clearly void on their face. As to

the R.I. Supreme Court denying the Plaintiff Equal Protection under the Law on

Febuary 28^th2002, the Plaintiff was adjudged in contempt for authoring and sending a

Disciplinary Committee Complaint to attorney Brenda Rioles. Evidence and testimony

was that the letter was sent after the final judgment entered and her services were

terminated, and the complaint involved Brenda Rioles witness tampering in Superior

Court when she passed along threats by the GAL to Plaintiff Carol that is she appeared in

Superior Court as a witness on Plaintiff John’s behalf an emergency motion to have her

children removed from her would immediately be filed in Family Court. There was no

evidence that that letter interfered with Family Court proceedings as required by Rule 65.

The Plaintiff Carol states that USC 28 Chap. 21 §455 guarantees the Plaintiff a right to a

fair and impartial hearing. The Plaintiff has already filed a motion in the RI Supreme

Court to recuse Judges Goldberg and Suttell, with a memoranda citing the reasons why

recusal should occur. The Plaintiff has filed for a change of venue to the Massachusetts

Supreme Court and will be filing affidavits in support of that motion. While the natural

remedy would appear to be the RI Supreme Court, the Plaintiff assures the Court that she

is not looking for an end run around the system, but simply cannot be guaranteed a fair

tribunal at the RI Supreme Court. Plaintiff states that she is not seeking any rights under

Family Law to be adjudicated by this Court, but is merely seeking that orders which were

entered by the Family Court without lawful authority and are therefore void, as the due

process violations were so flagrant be directed to be void. Under The Supreme Law

of the Land an appellate court's refusal to accept decide Constitutional Claims, such as

the Fourteenth Amendment claims and Equal Protection Under the Law claims asserted

here, allows the Constitutional questions to be resolved by the U.S. District Court. The

Plaintiff filed a timely Motion for a Rehearing and docketed the missing transcripts. That

motion was denied and the Supreme Court failed to include the Writ of Certitiori on the

order to which the transcripts supported. In addition the Judge Flaherty was not omitted

from the order even though he was recused. The Plaintiff filed a Motion for clarification

regarding these errors. The R.I. Supreme Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion and stated

that these were clerical oversights. The R.I Supreme Court stated in its order that they

carefully reviewed the transcripts and still refused to address the Constitutional claims

asserted by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff then filed a motion to vacate the entire 2-9-2004

opinion based on fraud by the R.I Supreme Court. The law of R.I. is quite clearly stated

in Lamarche, supra… it is the duty of the court to remove the cloud of a void judgment

no matter how, or when, it is brought to the Court’s attention. The Plaintiff paid for an

appellant review, and transcripts were entered into evidence at hearings but somehow not

transmitted to the R.I. Supreme Court in violation of the Rules. A transcript is not needed

to determine whether a motion to adjudge a party in contempt for a purported

admonishment by a third party is a justiciable issue. It is not and is void on its face. A

transcript is not needed to determine whether the Plaintiff due process rights to notice and

a meaningful opportunity to be heard was violated when there is no motion filed, no

certification of service and the Plaintiff was compelled to appear because of witness

subpoena duces tacem served on his person. The relief and nature of this complaint is far

different than the USC 1983 action, as new events have occurred and wile law is a

peculiar animal, the Plaintiff’s never would have imagined that the R.I. Supreme Court

would affirm void and fraudulent orders. Needless to say the Plaintiff’s couldn’t imagine

the consequences of a Family Court judge Mutter adjudicating Plaintiff John in contempt

of a Superior Court matter in which he had neither jurisdiction of the subject matter or

person, and then using that as a basis to sui juris remove placement from the mother

without notice or a hearing.

Article I, 13, provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law."

[Fn14] Supreme Court Judges Golberg, Suttell and Flanders heard and decided the case in the Bergquist vs Cesario matter. At the time the case was decided Judge Flanders announced his retirement at the age of 54 and without acquiring full tenure. It was unprecedented as no other Supreme Court Justice had ever done that. Flanders originally stated that he was pursuing other interests. Shortly after he was quoted in the Providence Journal as saying “that the thin veneer of respect he had for his colleagues was wearing thin”, and that the court made “many bad decisions”. While Flanders was and is known as a “good government advocate” and a dissenter, he did not dissent in the Cesario matter even though the RI Supreme Court clearly committed fraud, violated their oaths of office and committed treason on the R.I Constitution and he United States Constitution. Hopefully this case is an aberration. Supreme Court Judges Williams and Flaherty recused themselves. Judge Williams, who at the outset of this matter was a Superior Court judge, was the only trial court judge in either court who adjudicated an issue in strict compliance with the law.

[Fn15] The Defendant testified before Judge Procaccini that he had an agreement with Judge Fortunato to enter the fraudulent order of 2-28-2004. The Defendant fraudulently stated in a supplemental Rule 12a filing in the pending appeal before the R.I Supreme Court that the order of 8-20-2001 was incorporated into the fraudulent order presented by the Defendant, which was signed by Fortunato and affirmed by the Supreme Court of R.I. The Plaintiff’s cannot substantiate any judicial collusion claims between Judge Fortunato and the Defendant except the Defendants own words. The 2-28-2002 transcript does not show any incorporation of orders, and the Plaintiff’s attorney Judge Fortunato stated that their was no prior order in the file. Judge Procaccini found the Restraining Order not credible on May1st 2004, but did not vacate the order and it remains a menace to the Plaintiff, as well as causing the Plaintiff’s humiliation and embarrassment.

MISCELLANEOUS SUPPORTING FACTS

The substantiated allegations of bad faith, void orders and fraud should shock the Federal Courts conscience. The arrogance of Family Court knowingly and purposely violating civil rights under the color of law is best exampled by going to the record of the Plaintiff’s Motion For a Rehearing dated 8-25-2004. Plaintiff Carol cited a number of valid reasons for a rehearing, including a lack of due process and that Judge Mutter should have recused himself because he twice unlawfully sentenced the Plaintiff’s attorney to a 6 month criminal contempt jail sentence in violation of the law. Plaintiff Carol’s attorney’s unlawful criminal contempt convictions were twice overturned by the RI Supreme Court and the Plaintiff’s attorney sued Judge Mutter in Federal Court, the case has apparently been remanded to the RI Supreme Court. Judge Mutter’s violating Plaintiff’s Carol due process rights borders on criminal, as he stated that he changed placement of the children on March 24^th 2004 sui juris based on his determination that Plaintiff Carol was assisting Plaintiff John in violating a Superior and Supreme Court order. Plaintiff Carol was not a party to that suit nor did Judge Mutter have any jurisdiction to determine that Plaintiff John had violated any lawful decree of the Superior Court. Judge Bedrosian in Family Court would not hear Plaintiff’s valid motions that were properly docketed and served on the Defendant. Judge Bedrosian stated she could not find the docket sheet. A computer was on her clerk’s desk. Judge Bedrosian would not enforce rule 62 which is an automatic stay on Family Court judgments pending appeal. Judge Bedrosian stated to Plaintiff Carol that she had to file papers in the RI Supreme Court for a stay.

The R.I Supreme Court committed fraud of the court when they stated that the contempt of 8-20-2001 was civil when it was criminal. The R.I. Supreme Court stated that the restraining order could have been a purge of a civil contempt or an independent order, when they had already determined that Plaintiff John was not given a chance to purge his purported contempt. The R.I. Supreme Court did not need the transcripts to vacate the December 10^th 2001 hearing as there is no such law which would make an “admonition” a court order nor was there any law which would allow the Defendant to bring a contempt motion on behalf of a third party. The volume of void orders, as well as the Courts failing to allow hearings on the merits or motions to vacate is shocking.

In reading the opinion dated 2-9-2004 of the R.I Supreme Court, one would be lead to conclude that these were all pro se hearings. The Defendant had high profile attorneys John D. Lynch and Kevin Bristow, in and out of these matters. The record is devoid of any entry or withdrawls of appearance by the Defendants attorneys. The Plaintiff had the assistance of attorney Kevin McKenna. In reading the opinion of 2-28-2002 one would think the Plaintiff John could have had something to do with a purported death threat letter and anthrax envelope mailed to Rioles. The first that Plaintiff John heard of such a purported mailing was when Judge Fortunato attempted to allow this letter into evidence. Plaintiff John was never questioned by any police department regarding the purported death threat letter from Hartford or the purported anthrax hoax. Plaintiff’s would not be surprised if Rioles herself was responsible for these letters. Plaintiff John has readily admitted any letters authored by him.

[Fn16] In the divorce matter the Defendant had 3 domestic restraining orders placed on him, he was arrested by the Cranston Police for assaulting Carol and their were numerous police reports in which officers documented the Defendants verbal abuse in the presence of the children. The Plaintiff’ Carol’s sister and brother in law obtained a restraining order against the Defendant before Judge Procaccini because of his threatening behavior. The Defendant was found to have driven to the home of Carol’s friend’s and threaten them as so they would not appear as witnesses for Carol in Family Court On December 18^th 2002 Judge Voccola found by a finding of fact that the Defendant was obsessed with John Cesario and destructively conveyed that anger at Carol, both verbally and non verbally in the presence of the children. The moral of [Fn16] is that it pays to have a corrupt attorney in divorce litigation.

[Fn17] To date, the only charges against the Plaintiff John that contempt of courts were granted was because he wrote belittling letters to Family Court officials which did not effect the divorce and for writing a disciplinary complaint against attorneys for witness tampering in Superior Court. The Defendant has failed in four hearing after 2-28-2002 to have the Plaintiff adjudged in contempt.

[Fn18] The R.I. Supreme Court Disciplinary Committee, in violation of their own rules, did not require attorneys Lynch, Rioles or Rapoza to file written responses to very serious complaints including witness tampering, altering court documents, blatantly lying to judges during proceedings and filing repeated fraudulent orders.

70. Plaintiff’s reaver, reallege and incorporate the preceding paragraphs 1-69 in the following causes of action.

Causes of Action

I. FRAUD On the Court and Against the Plaintiffs which would void orders.

A. The August 20^th 2001 Superior Court hearing was not designated “civil’ by the hearing justice as the RI Supreme Court claimed, and in fact had previously been designated as criminal by both the Supreme Court and the US District Court. The Plaintiff John appeared in court May 31^st 2001 and August 20^th 2001not by a valid motions informing him of charges against him, but was commanded to appear fraudulently through the issuance of witness subpoena’s.

B. The August 31^st 2001 restraining order affirmed by the R.I Supreme Court was not a “purge of a civil contempt or an independent order as the R.I Supreme Court claimed. The U.S. District Court had already determined that the hearing of 8-20-2001 was a criminal contempt hearing. The R.I Supreme Court was in possession of that report.

C. The Defendant committed Fraud on the Court by presenting a motion which was untimely and sought to have the Plaintiff John in contempt for an admonishment which never occurred. There is no Law or Rule in the State of R.I. that the Defendant could seek to adjudge the Plaintiff John in contempt for an admonishment.

D. The Superior Court Order from the hearing of Febuary 28^th 2002 was FRAUDULENTLY prepared by the Defendant, the Defendant knew that Judge Fortunato did not order a restraining order on Febuary 28^th 2002. The Defendant committed extrinsic fraud on the Court. The Defendant even states that he had an agreement with Judge Fortunato to merge a previous order which Judge Fortunato denied placing on the Defendant into the order dated March 1^st 2002. The fraud intentionally and maliciously perpetrated by the Defendant has caused injury to the Plaintiff’s reputation, finances and lifestyle. The Plaintiff initiated this fraud knowing full well that Judge Fortunato did not sign an order restraining the Plaintiff from the August 31^st 2001 hearing. The Defendant had the transcript and was in court on 10-22-2001 when Judge Fortunato denied placing a restraining order on the Plaintiff. The Defendant admitted in court filings that Judge Fortunato agreed to merge the order of 8-31-2001 into the Febuary 28^th 2002 order when there is no record in the 2-28-2002 hearing of Judge Fortunato making any statement which would support that.

E. The Final Judgment in the matter of Bergquist vs Bergquist is fraud on the Court as the order presented by ATTORNEY BRENDA RIOLES states that the decision pending final entry and the stipulation dated December 6^th 2001 was merged and incorporated into the final judgment, no such hearing took place to merge or incorporate either. ATTORNEY BRENDA RIOLES committed fraud on the Court. Plaintiff’s have numerous annotated statutes regarding extrinsic fraud causing an order to be void. The Plaintiff’s here note that the fraud on the Court was committed by Attorney Rioles and not Judge Bedrosian who actually entered the final Judgment.

II. Procedural Due Process Violations protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Prior to any hearing on the merits

F. Plaintiff John did not receive any notice as to the contempt hearing of 8-20-2001 which renders the hearing void. Plaintiff John opportunity to be heard was prejudiced as he did not know the charges against him. Plaintiff John is not seeking a review of judgment but a review whether the hearing should have occurred. As noted, the R.I Supreme Court passed on entertaining the Plaintiff John’s Constitutional claims.

G. Plaintiff John did not receive any notice as to the restraining order placed upon on 8-31-2001, as it was a condition of reducing an unlawful criminal sentence which was vacated..

H. Plaintiff John did not receive any notice to the possible entry of a purported admonishment nor was he allowed to be heard on the matter on October 22^nd 2001. There is no law, statute or rule regarding “purported admonishments”.

I. Plaintiff John did not receive any notice nor was given an opportunity to be heard on the restraining order issued on him from the Febuary 28^th 2002 hearing.

J. Plaintiff John did not receive any notice nor was allowed to be heard and present evidence in opposition to a void entry of an order restricting his ability to file pro se pleadings.

K. Plaintiff Carol did not receive any notice or opportunity to be heard on either the Decision Pending Final Entry which was objected to and then entered as an order, and the Plaintiff Carol was not notified or allowed to be heard on December 18^th 2001, nor does the Plaintiff Carol know how that day was arbitrarily chosen as it was not set down on the calendar to be heard.

L. Plaintiff Carol was not given proper notice on March 24^th 2004 that she was the subject of a possible restraining order, the only valid motion before the court which would indicate such an order being contemplated was prayer on a contempt motion which was not granted.

M. Plaintiff Carol was not given proper notice or an opportunity to be heard on March 24^th 2004 that she was a motion to change placement was validly before the Court. Defendant had asked for such relief in a contempt motion, but the motion for contempt was not granted. Judge Mutter stated he issued the order “Sui Juris” when the issue of insuffiency of notice was presented to him.

III. EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW

N. The Family Court and the Superior Court are courts created by the General Assembly of R.I. and their jurisdiction and ability to adjudicate matters and retain lawful subject matter jurisdiction is requisite on a strict adherence to the laws of the General Assembly and the Rules of both the Family and Superior court Rules of Procedures. A prerequisite to a judge hearing a matter without a jury is strict compliance with the Rules of Procedure, including notice requirements, judges are also bound to protect litigants rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection Under the Law. As we are a land of common law, it is well settled that one could not expect to reasonably defend a cause if there is no notice or proper notice of the cause of action. Plaintiff’s have nearly 30 annotated statutes regarding void orders. As the laws of R.I clearly state Family and Superior Court achieve their empowerment to act based on strict compliance with the laws and Rules of Procedures, any non compliance PRIOR to an adjudication strips the Court(s) of the power to enter an order or judgment. If the laws are not applied properly prior to an adjudication of a SPECIFIC SUBJECT MATTER, despite having VENUE and the AUTHORITY TO HEAR SPECIFIC AND GENERAL SUBJECT MATTER, the process of determining the matter before the Court is violative of rights protected by the Equal Protection Under The Law clause of the United States Constitution.

O. The Plaintiff’s claim that the Superior Court order of 8-20-2001 affirmed by the By the R.I Supreme Court was violating his rights under Equal Protection of the Law. The hearing was clearly criminal according to the law. The Plaintiff’s claim that the restraining order of 8-31-2001 in superior court did not afford the Plaintiff John Equal Protection Under the Law based on Rule 65. The Plaintiff’s claim that the hearing of 10-22-2001 was a denial of the Plaintiff’s Equal protection Under the Law as the motion by Defendant was not before the court because of notice deficiencies. Plaintiff John was denied Equal Protection Under the Law on December 10^th 2001 because Bergquist failed to State a Claim that relief could be based on, there is no statute or law that would allow Defendant to make a complaint on behalf of a third party. The Restraining Order from the Febuary 28^th 2002 hearing is a violation of rights protected by the Equal Protection clause because there is no law which would allow a litigant to prepare, or a judge to sign, an order of the court which fraudulently represents the bench decision.

P. The Plaintiff Carol was denied Equal Protection Under the Law on December 7^th 2001 when a Decision Pending Final Entry was entered as an order in violation of the Rules because a pending objection had not been heard, Plaintiff was denied Equal Protection Under the Law when a Final Judgment entered without a hearing. Plaintiff further was denied Equal Protection Under the Law on March 24^th 2004 when a restraining order entered against her in violation of the law and placement of her children was removed from her in violation of the law. Plaintiff is being denied equal protection under the law based USC 28 Chap. 21 §455 as it seems apparent that she is unable to get a fair adjudication in the R.I Supreme Court based on that Courts fraud in Bergquist Vs Cesario. The Plaintiff is being denied Equal Protection under the Law as there is a valid court order imposing child support on the Defendant that has been in effect for nearly 4 years but the Plaintiff cannot get the RI Family Court to adjudicate a child support contempt motion.

As the Congress has empowered and expects Federal Courts to protect citizens from States failing to comply with rights protected by the Constitution of the United states and its Amendments, the Plaintiff’s complaint requests the Federal Courts strike down void judgments which violate those protected rights. To be "judicial in nature," proceedings must involve "‘[a] judicial inquiry [that] investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. If purported judicial hearings initiate without complying with the prerequisite pleadings to allow the court authority, orders that are entered from that proceeding are void and it is as the said hearings never occurred at all. Except the orders entered in violation of Fourth, Fifth Amendment rights are a menace to the Plaintiff’s.

A judge of the Superior and Family Court acquires its authority through the R.I General Assembly, and judges sitting without juries are required to fully comply with the law and Rules of Procedures before adjudicating any matters. The R.I Supreme Court stating that the Superior Court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff is misleading. The Court didn’t address whether the Superior Court had proper subject matter over specific hearings. The Plaintiff states that the R.I. Supreme Court failing to address the subject matter jurisdiction of specific pleadings is fraud. Can the Superior Court order the Plaintiff to arbitrarily wear his pants backwards if a proper motion giving the Plaintiff notice wasn’t before the Court. If the Court dicta amounted to an admonishment to have a nice day and the plaintiff fell down the stairs could he be held in contempt. How could subject matter jurisdiction be established for a purported admonishment result in a contempt conviction when there is no law which allows a person to be held in contempt for an admonishment.

U.S. Supreme Court holing MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS v. ADAMS, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) The manner of notice provided to appellant did not meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.. Prior to an action that will affect an interest in life, liberty, or property protected by the Due Process Clause, a State must provide "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 243 U.S. 90 Wetmore v. Karrack, 205 U.S. 141, 149 (1907). The “departure from established modes of procedure render judgment void,” Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 282 (1876). Particularly when the procedural defects are of sufficient magnitude and “so unfair as to deprive the proceeding of its vitality.” Eagles v. U.S., 329 U.S. 304, 314 (1946). See, Eberhardt v. Intergrated Design & Construction, Inc., 167 F. 3d 861, 871 (4th Cir. 1999); Schwartz v. U.S., 976 F.3d 213, 217(4th Cir. 1992) (judgment void if rendering court lacked personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or wanting in due process; Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Marlboro Cotton Mills Co., 282 F. 811,814-816 (4th Cir. 1922) (equity enjoins judgment obtained by fraud); Resolute Insurance Co. v. North Carolina, 397 F.2d 586, 589 (4th Cir. 1968) (federal court may entertain a collateral attack on a state court judgment wanting in due process); Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 271, 292-293 fn.8 (6th Cir.1998); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir.2004) (plaintiff in federal court can seek to set aside a state court judgment as void as obtained by fraud, citing Barrow v. Hunton); .

HENRY D. McDONALD, Plff. in Err., v. F. A. MABEE. No. 135, GREENE v. LINDSEY, 456 U.S. 444 (1982) "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and them afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 . Pp. 449-450.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 491; 86 S. Ct. 1603 "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no 'rule making' or legislation which would abrogate them. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 155 (1966), cited also in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.."649.644 "Constitutional  'rights' would be of little value if they could be indirectly denied."

Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220, 1 S. Ct. at 261 (1882)"No man [or woman] in this country is so high that he is above the law.  No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity.  All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it."

Duncan v. Missouri, 15 Due process of law and the equal protection of the laws are secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958)The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "no state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it". See also In Re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (188); U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S. Ct. 471, 66 L. Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821).

Void judgment is one where court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or entry of order violated due process, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5

Plaintiff’s are at a loss to explain why so many flagrant legal abuses have occurred. The Plaintiff’s state that they are not attempting to set aside valid adjudications of State Courts, but are seeking to vacate judgments procured by fraud or which clear statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment bared the state from hearing based on the insufficient pleadings. The Plaintiff’s vigorously objected to the U.S. R.I. District Court’s dismissing the Plaintiff’ s previous USC 1983 action. The Plaintiff’s were vigorous not to be disrespectful to the Court, but as the Court is the Guardian of inalienable rights protected by the United States Constitution; the Plaintiff’s were sure more abuses would occur without the United States District Court’s intervention. While the Plaintiff’s USC 1983 action was dismissed, the report and recommendation of Judge Martin did point out that Judge Fortunato stated on 10-22-2001:

Fortunato: “ and yet, you have motion to lift the restraining order here, that says you asked me to lift the restraining placed on you from being near the Bergquist girls. I probably said, I think it is a good idea in light of this to have such an order, and indeed, if there weren’t one, I would probably issue one”. How could the R.I. Supreme Court ordered the restraining order that was never issued by Judge Fortunato as a purge or independent order to remain in full force and effect? The transcript further read:

Cesario: This is not a Family Court hearing. You put a restraining order on me without any basis that I’ve done anything wrong based on the lies that he told you.

Fortunato: Wait a minute. The initial restraining order was put on you long before I knew this case existed. You were restrained and enjoined by Judge Williams at the outset of this matter from interfering with or harassing Mr. Bergquist. At some later point. Whether you regret it or not, you have represented that you agreed to have that extended as some sort of mutual order. So, I never issued the original order in this case. Here it is, 12/5/2000. I think it was the second order issued in this matter. The first order was issued by Judge Williams in favor of Mr. Bergquist who came here on his behalf and also on behalf of his minor children. He got that order on 1/28/2000. On December 5^th of 2000, he turned that into a mutual restraining order, and those are the orders that control the behavior of the parties.

[Fn19] The Supreme Court opinion clearly states that 12-05-2000 order did not include the children. As previously stated, the 11/28/2000 order was a TRO. The 12/5/2000 was a simple one page order that did not include any children, nor did the 11/28/2000 order control any behavior. Prior to this interchange Fortunato requested to see the 8-20-2001 and 8-31-2000 transcripts from Attorney Bristow, and then recessed. The 8-31-2001 transcript clearly states Fortunato granting the Plaintiff’s motion to reduce sentence, but as a condition the Plaintiff was restrained from contacting the children.

Cesario: The order for the minor children was denied by Judge Williams

Fortunato: Well, if it was, it doesn’t say it on the order, and equity speaks through decrees.

Cesario: I have the transcript.

Fortunato: In any event……

[Fn20] Fortunato committed clear fraud, as the order did not contain the minors. A wonderful mother’s children were taken from her and given to the Defendant who is a child abuser, without notice or being given the opportunity to be heard. The R.I Supreme Court affirmed this order, despite the judge saying he didn’t enter the order and no decree being signed. The order, or non order, did not originate from either a purge of a civil contempt or an independent order, as the R.I. Supreme Court opinion fraudulently represents.

Judge Martin’s report also clearly articulated the Plaintiff’s claim that after telling Judge Fortunato that the Defendant was telling these children that they were going to be murdered and harmed by Plaintiff John, and that their mother was going to have her head chopped off by Plaintiff John, that Fortunato twice responded that he is their father and he can say anything he wants to them.

[Fn21] The children didn’t have any interaction with Plaintiff John until 9-2003, and despite the Defendants repeated attempts to instill fears in the children, the children were happy and interacted very well with Plaintiff John as video’s proved in the Superior Court hearings.

PLAINTIFF’S RESPECTFULLY REQUEST / DEMAND A JURY TRIAL Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment.

RELIEF REQUESTED BY PETITIONERS BY THIS HONRABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF RHODE ISLAND

1. Enter a final judgment declaring the civil contempt orders affirmed by the R.I Supreme Court on 2-9-2004 from the Superior Court matter PC 00-6141, dated 8-20 2001 and May 31^st 2001 void ab initio as the hearing violated rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, there was no adjudication on the merits by the Supreme Court and the order is a fraud.

2. Enter a final judgment striking the fraudulent order restraining dated 8-31-2001 on the Plaintiff, which was affirmed by the R.I Supreme Court order of 2-9-2004 Void ab initio as the order is both fraudulent and in violation of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. Enter a final judgment Vacating a “purported admonishment” and enter a final judgment vacating any relief granted to the Defendant on October 22^nd 2001 as the motion presented by the Defendant did not comport with the law as required by the RI Superior Court Rules of Procedure with regard to notice requirements.

4. Enter a final judgment vacating the contempt conviction dated December 10^th 2001 as the Plaintiff was denied Equal Protection under the law as the Defendant could not bring a complaint for a third party and there is no law with which the Plaintiff could be held in contempt for an admonishment.

5. Enter a final judgment vacating the contempt conviction of Febuary 28^th 2002 in Superior Court based on it being void because the relief was based on the void December 10^th 2001 hearing, and to uphold a conviction would violate the Plaintiffs equal protection under the law right..

6. Enter a final judgment vacating the restraining order from the hearing of Febuary 28^th 2002 in Superior Court, because of lack of notice and an opportunity to be heard and fraud.

7. Enter a final judgment vacating the Rule 11 violation of 8-22-2002 in Superior Court based on the order being void as to lack of notice and an lack of an opportunity to be heard.

8. Enter a final judgment to vacate the sua sponte restriction of pro se filings on May 1^st 2004 in Superior Court as it is void because of lack of notice and an opportunity to be heard.

9. Enter a final judgment to vacate the Decision Pending Final Judgment decree dated 9-17-2001 in Family Court as the order is fraudulent and was entered over a valid objection and is a violation of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

10. Enter a final judgment vacating the final decree of December 18^th 2001as it was fraudulently entered in Family Court. The order is fraudulent and void..

11. Enter a final judgment to vacate the restraining order placed on the Plaintiff Carol on March 24^th 2004 as the Plaintiff was denied due process and Equal Protection Under the Law and the order is void.

12. Enter a final judgment vacating the CHANGE OF PLACEMENT order in Family Court based on the hearing in Family Court 3-24-2004 as it is void because of due process violations and violations of equal Protection Under the law.

13. Enter a final judgment that the Defendant be ordered to repay the Plaintiff John Cesario all funds ordered released to him from the Registry of the Superior Court which was, and still is the property of John Cesario, with interest

DECLARATION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1746

Executed this ___day of January, 2004 under penalty of

perjury pursuant 28 U .S.C. § 1746.

_____________________________

John Cesario Plaintiff

______________________________

Carol Cesario Plaintiff

64 Verdant Drive, Cranston R.I 02920

401-615 -0549

SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF CAROL CESARIO

I, Carol Cesario, swear that the following facts are true. I was married to the Defendant and gave birth to three girls ages 13, 9 and 6 during the marriage. I filed for divorce from the Defendant in June of 2000 because he was having an affair with a neighbor. The case was Bergquist vs Bergquist FC -00-1371. A hearing which was designated Decision Pending Final Judgment occurred on 9-17-2001 in Providence Family Court . Judge Bedrosian presided and specifically ordered that the only restraining order on the parties was to be that unrelated males and females are not to be in the presence of the children, and that the child support order remain in full force and effect. The Defendants attorney, John D Lynch, presented a decree from the Hearing of the Deceision Pending Final Judgment which omitted these orders. My attorney, Brenda Rioles, filed a timely objection to that order. The rules state that an order cannot enter until the objection is resolved. The State law states that a judge sitting without a jury must comply with the rules. On December 6^th 2001 I appeared in Family Court with witnesses from family members to DCYF case workers. I was not heard on that day as judge Bedrosian violated her own order of which stated there would be no more continuances. Under duress from the Defendant screaming and harassing me I initialed a stipulation. The stipulation stated that the final judgment was to enter December 6^th 2001. I immediately called my attorney Brenda Rioles and told her I did not want that stipulation to enter, and I wanted to go before Judge Bedrosian for a hearing. The stipulation was not signed by any judge nor did I appear before Judge Bedrosian. The record proves that no hearing occurred on December 6^th 2001. The stipulation did not merge or incorporate any judgments into a final judgment. Rioles prepared a fraudulent order which did not accurately represent the stipulation and had judge Jeremiah sign it on 12-7-2001. I did not receive any notice that this had occurred. The order fraudulently stated that the decision pending final judgment and the stipulation were to be merged and incorporated into the final decree. There was no hearing or stipulation regarding authorizing any judgments to be merged or incorporated into the final judgment. Brenda Rioles called me on or about December 18^th 2001 and told me the divorce was final. I filed motions to vacate the stipulation of December 6^th 2001due to attorney misrepresentation which were never heard.

The Defendant repeatedly filed contempt motions against me for having my husband in the presence of the children. The Defendant did not prosecute 13 of them as they were to intimidate and harass me. After the Defendant’s RI Supreme Court case was heard at oral argument in the RI Supreme Court, the Defendant pressed one of his contempt motions. The Defendant had fraudulently presented an order for Judge Fortunato to sign in the Superior Court matter PC 00-6141 which stated that on Febuary 28^th 2002 John Cesario (my husband and Plaintiff in this matter) is restrained and enjoined from contacting my children. My husband did not receive any notice nor was given an opportunity to be heard in opposition to this order. The order was never even stated by Judge Fortunato, the Defendant just made it up.

During the contempt proceeding against me that began in the fall of 2004, the Defendant sought a restraining order against me from having my husband in the children John and physical placement of our children transferred to him, through his prayers for relief on his contempt motion. The children have resided with me since birth. It was determined that there was not a restraining order against me in the Family Court Judge Mutter, and I was not found to be in contempt. Without notice or a hearing, Judge Mutter found me unfit and restrained me from having my husband in the presence of the children and changed placement of the children to my the Defendant. This violated my rights to Equal Protection Under the Law and Due Process Rights protected by the United States Constitution. THE SUPREME COURT OF R.I had affirmed the fraudulent order prepared by the Defendant and signed by Judge Fortunato. The R.I. Supreme Court did not address any of my husbands Constitutional claims in opposition to that restraining order. The R.I Supreme Court never even cited how a letter to a disciplinary committee regarding my attorneys participation in threatening me that if I appeared as a witness in Superior Court hearing to an attorney who did not represent me anymore in a divorce that was over in any way interfered with the divorce.

Judge Mutter found me unfit for assisting my husband in violating a void, fraudulent restraining order of the Superior Court affirmed by the RI Supreme Court. Judge Muuter is a Family Court judge and does not have any jurisdiction of Superior Court matters to which I was not a party. Judge Mutter did not allow my attorney to oppose the order nor was a motion for a change of placement or a restraining order before the court. On 8-25-2004, on my motion for a rehearing, Judge Mutter stated that the court entered the order sui juris. Judge Mutter should have recused himself as he twice unlawfully found my attorney in criminal contempt during his divorce. The RI Supreme Court overturned both convictions. My attorney sued Judge Mutter.

The RI Family Court has repeatedly abused me, allowing attorneys to enter fraudulent orders, allowing the Defendant’s attorney, Attorney John D Lynch to blatantly lie to the court, they have refused to allow me to heard on my motions to vacate or to have home studies. Judge Bedrosian has fraudulently stated that the order of March 24^th 2004 changing placement is not automatically stayed during an appeal even though the Rule 62 of Domestic Procedures clearly states that it is. She has denied hearing my motions based on her claiming not to be able to locate the docket sheet, even though a simple call to the clerk or the computer on her own clerks desk could provide the docket sheet.

The Defendant has been telling my children that John Cesario, my husband, is going to harm them, and even kill them. The Defendant uses these sham restraining orders to perpetuate his lies and tell the children that John has acted in a manner that would warrant the Family Court, the Superior Court and the Supreme Court to restrain him.

The Family Court has found that the Defendant is obsessed with my husband and destructively conveys that anger both verbally and non verbally in the presence of the children while unleashing his anger at me. Judge Procassini of Superior Court restrained the Defendant from my family because he was threatening them. Judge Procassini found that the Defendant was threatening my witnesses. Judge Procassini found that the Defendant threatened my husband while my children were in the courtroom.

Family Court repeatedly allows fraudulent orders to enter without hearing objections and I cannot expect a partial RI Supreme Court to determine this as it was the fraud by that court which allowed Judge Mutter of Family Court to act.

In seeking relief from the R.I. Supreme Court for a stay of the orders of March 24^th 2004, I have been denied despite the Supreme Court having been briefed that the lower court will not enforce the automatic stay and the RI Supreme Court having concrete evidence that their was not a valid motion before the Family Court to restrain me or change placement of my children. The RI Supreme Court has in the record that Judge Mutter’s statements on 8-25-2004 that he knew I did not receive notice but the court entered the order sui juris.

I am pregnant and am under extreme emotional duress as the Defendant uses these void restraining orders to embarrass and harass me at my children’s school, with their friends parents and with my children. My children are constantly being told lies about my husband by the Defendant and he is using these fraudulent restraining orders to hurt my children. My children couldn’t attend my marriage because of these bogus orders and now these orders are ruining what should be a wonderful time for them, getting ready to have a baby brother or sister.

Carol Cesario Plaintiff in the matter of John and Carol Cesario vs Stephen Bergquist

__________________________________

NOTARY