IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
)
vs. )
Civil Action No._________
)
VERONICA BLAKE, )
Defendant )
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF
Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky hereby notices
his claim for relief
under
penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 with the
particularity
required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil
Procedure as follows:
1.
This
is a separate and independent action in the nature
of a bill of equity available under
Maryland common law, Sisk v.
Garey,
27 Md.401, 414-19(1867); Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Nationwide
Construction Co., 224
A.2d 285,290-91 (Md.1966). A
venerable equitable common law remedy
arising directly under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United
States Constitution, available at any
time to collaterally attack
a final state court judgment as void
for process irregularities
and “departure(s) from established
modes of procedure”, Windsor
v.
McVeigh, 93
U.S.274, 281-282 (1876), as well as deliberate
acts of extrinsic fraud, rendering a
farce and mockery of
Plaintiffs’ rights to a full and fair
opportunity to be heard on
core matters related to rights, which
are fundamental human
rights, including those rights that
are enjoyed by the
parent-child relationship. Said irregularities, departures and
extrinsic fraud resulted in the entry of a Final Judgment of
Absolute Divorce on March 22, 1999 in
Blake-Roginsky v.
Roginsky, No. CV 97-780 in the Circuit Court
for Charles County,
Maryland awarding permanent custody of
his then 4.5 year old son,
Plaintiff Joshua Roginsky to Defendant Blake, as well as
awarding the Defendant pre-marital
assets of Plaintiff Jacob
Roginsky. Subsequent to the March 22, 1999 order, in proceedings
wrought with irregularities, departures
from established modes of
procedure and extrinsic fraud the
Circuit Court ruled against
Jacob Roginsky in two actions on remand
from the Maryland Special
Court Of Appeals, one action to hold
Defendant in contempt and to
change custody of Joshua, and an
emergency hearing in connection
with Defendant’s unilateral
interruption in Plaintiffs’ telephone
and physical contact. See also, Barrows v. Hutton, 99 U.S.
80,83(1878) Cook v. Alexandria National Bank, 282 A.2d 97,100-
101(Md. 1971); Oppenheimer
v. Michbar Co., 63 A.2d 765, 768-
69(Md. 1949); Thomas v. Hardisty, 143 A.2d 618,624-25(Md. 1958);
Wetmore
v. Karrick, 205
U.S. 141,149 (1907); Baldwin v. Hale, 1
Wall.
223, 17 L.Ed. 531 (1864); Hovey v.
Elliott, 167 U.S. 409
(1897); Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S.327, 329-33 (1986);
Resolute
Insurance Co. v. North Carolina, 397
F.2d 586,589(4th
Cir.1968); Yale v National Indemnity Co., 602 F.2d 642,644-45(4th
Cir.1979); Welden v. United States, 70 F.3d 1,11- 15(2d
Cir.1995); Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 287-290, 293-95 & fn.8
(6th Cir.1998); Willams v. New Orleans Public Service,Inc.,
728
F.2d 730, 735(5th Cir.1984); Fontana Empire Center v.
City of
Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992-95 (9th
Cir.2002); Simanonok v.
Simanonok,787 F.2d 1517, 1522(11th
Cir.1986). This common law
bill of equity, arising under
the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is
brought by Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky, on his
own behalf and on
behalf of his son Joshua, as next
friend.
II. JURISDICTION
2. This Court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear a
separate and independent action in the nature of a bill of equity
under Maryland common law, Sisk v. Garey, 27 Md.401, 414-19
(1867), collaterally attacking a final state court judgment as
void is invoked under this Court’s federal question
jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the substantive
claim presented herein arises directly
under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States
Constitution. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.226, 242(1979). This
Court has original and complete
jurisdiction to “’entertain an
independent action in equity for relief from judgment on the
basis of its independent and substantive equitable jurisdiction’”
for claims arising directly under the United States Constitution.
Welden v. United States, 70 F.3d 1,10-11(2nd Cir.1995),[quoting
United States v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373, 1378(11th 1982)]. See,
Barrows v. Hutton, 99 U.S. 80,83(1878); Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d
279, 287-290-95 & fn.8 (6th Cir.1998); Simanonok v. Simanonok,787
F.2d 1517, 1522(11th Cir.1986). Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky also
invokes jurisdiction of this court under the Diversity
Jurisdiction statue, 28 USC § 1332: a) Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky
permanently resides in the State of Virginia whereas the
Defendant is a resident of the State of Maryland and b) the
amount in controversy in this suit exceeds the requisite $75,000.
III. PARTIES
3. Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky, an adult citizen and
resident of Dahlgren, Virginia, brings this
action on his own
behalf, as well as natural father and next
friend of his minor
son, Joshua Roginsky.
4. Defendant Veronica Blake, an adult
citizen and
resident of Waldorf, Maryland, natural
mother of Joshua Roginsky,
is sued herein as the real party of
interest for declaratory
relief only.
IV. STATEMENT
OF FACTS
5.
Plaintiff, Jacob Roginsky, is an adult citizen and
resident of Virginia. Plaintiff is the
former spouse of Veronica Blake and the father of Joshua Roginsky (hereafter
“Joshua”), a minor child, and real party of interest herein. Defendant, Veronica Blake, is an adult
citizen and resident of Maryland and the mother of Joshua Roginsky.
6. On December 30, 1993 Plaintiff and Ms. Blake married. A child of the marriage, Joshua Roginsky (hereinafter "Joshua"), was born on July 26, 1994.
7. As a result of long-standing and continuing neglect and child endangerment by Ms. Blake of Joshua Roginsky and her refusal to undergo psychiatric treatment recommended to her by a clinical psychologist, Plaintiff separated from Ms. Blake and as of December 1996, Joshua resided primarily with Plaintiff.
8. In
March 1997 Ms. Blake retained Attorney William F. Olmsted of the Charles County
(Maryland) law firm of Olmsted & Olmsted to represent her in divorce
proceedings against Plaintiff. From the time she employed Mr. Olmsted, Ms.
Blake repeatedly told Plaintiff that Mr. Olmsted had told her he was able to
manipulate and opportune–-by improper influence–-the Circuit Court for Charles
County to obtain favorable results for his clients.
9. On April 1, 1997, upon the advice of Mr.
Olmsted, Ms. Blake instituted a sham ex parte domestic violence proceeding in
the Circuit Court for Charles County, in which she alleged falsely and
maliciously that Plaintiff had threatened to kill her. Ms. Blake alleged further,
with knowing and malicious falsity, that she had tape-recorded Plaintiff’s
threats to kill her, but later admitted she did not have such recording. Ms. Blake sought removal of Joshua from
Plaintiff's care and a restraining order barring Plaintiff from her
residence. Without notice or hearing,
the foregoing relief was granted on a temporary basis. Plaintiffs Joshua and
Jacob Roginsky were deprived substantially of their rights, including to
parent-child relationship, companionship and care, custody and nurture by Jacob
Roginsky of his son, Joshua.
10. On
April 7, 1997, prior to the hearing on
Ms. Blake’s allegation that Plaintiff had threatened to kill her, Mr. Olmsted
attempted to extort a financial settlement from Plaintiff by saying that Ms. Blake
would withdraw her accusations, which Defendant Blake knew to be false, as, on
information and belief, did Mr. Olmsted, in exchange for Plaintiff’s promise of
ongoing financial support. Plaintiff
refused to yield to the illegal pressure that Olmsted and Blake exerted on him
through the abuse of the judicial process.
11. During the hearing on Ms. Blake’s
domestic violence Ms. Blake made
materially false statements under oath, including but not limited to the
following: that Plaintiff had threatened to harm and/or kill her; that she had
not threatened Plaintiff; that she had not threatened Joshua; that she had
never harmed Joshua.
12. At the conclusion of the
hearing on Ms. Blake’s
domestic violence petition, the
presiding judge–-the Honorable Steven G. Chappelle, Associate Judge of the
Circuit Court for Charles County–-denied all relief sought by Ms. Blake as
based on unfounded allegations and noted that Ms. Blake was “fitting square
pegs into the round holes.” As a result of the frivolous vexatious domestic
violence claims brought by Ms.Blake, Plaintiff suffered from the separation
from his son, who was not returned to Plaintiff in spite of the court’s
rejection of Ms. Blake’s fraudulent domestic violence action.
13. On or about April 14, 1997,
following the failed domestic violence proceedings, Mr. Olmsted offered to
mediate a temporary support and parenting agreement between Plaintiff and Ms.
Blake. Mr. Olmsted again attempted to
extort money by threatening that Ms. Blake would move to Jamaica, her country
of origin with Joshua. Plaintiff refused to yield to blackmail. Mr. Olmsted
then offered to arrange for Plaintiff to see Joshua for a half a day. When
Plaintiff saw Joshua, Joshua's face was covered with rashes and scratches and
his eyes were full of mucous. Then, Ms. Blake handed Plaintiff a paper to sign
to certify that Joshua was all right, which Plaintiff refused to sign not only
because it was insulting, but because he knew it was a set-up by Blake to later
claim that Joshua became sick in his custody.
A physician who saw Joshua immediately thereafter said Joshua must not
be returned to the environment where the rash developed, as Ms. Blake’s
residence at the time was in a crack house, with animals and smoke to which
Joshua, a pre-asthmatic child, was allergic.
14. On
April 15, 1997, Plaintiff hired Mary Sue Greisman, an attorney who regularly
practiced domestic law in Charles County, for the purpose of obtaining vigorous
and competent representation in the domestic and custody litigation between
Plaintiff and Ms. Blake. On or about April 15, 1997, Plaintiff wrote to Mr.
Olmsted and expressed dissatisfaction with Mr. Olmsted’s "neutral"
mediation. Plaintiff informed Mr. Olmsted of Joshua's medical condition and
about the environment in Ms. Blake's residence. Plaintiff told Mr. Olmsted to negotiate directly with
Ms. Greisman temporary arrangements to
shared custody and financial support of Joshua.
15. At the time of Plaintiff’s
employment of Ms. Greisman as aforesaid and continuing, Judge Nalley had
created and was perpetuating a judicial climate in his court, by the abuse of
his judicial and administrative authority, in which litigants whose opponents
were represented by a number of local attorneys favored by Judge Nalley, including
Mr. Olmsted, could not secure fair and impartial determination of their claims
and/or defenses in the Circuit Court for Charles County. The climate was fostered by Judge Nalley by
means of irregularities in the administration of the court and violations of
rules of the court and legal and constitutional requirements.
16. Throughout this period Ms.
Blake continued to boast and predict to Plaintiff that Mr. Olmsted would
"fix” the divorce and custody case through the use of his connections to
the Charles County courthouse.
17. In
early June of 1997, Plaintiff discharged Ms. Greisman for refusal to perform
and kowtowing to the opposing counsel. Soon
thereafter Plaintiff spoke with Mr. Olmsted about a scheduled hearing on
pendente lite provisions for custody of Joshua. Mr. Olmsted told Plaintiff the subject hearing was a formality of
little consequence to the final determination of custody and that, accordingly,
Plaintiff needed not worry about being represented by counsel at it. Mr.
Olmsted’s foregoing statements were deliberate blatant misrepresentations, were
intended by Mr. Olmsted for Plaintiff’s reliance upon, and Plaintiff did rely
on them. Plaintiff relied on Mr. Olmsted’s above-described statement to the
extent that, although Plaintiff preferred to be represented by counsel at the
hearing, Plaintiff did not consider the employment of successor counsel a
matter of immediate urgency or high priority. Plaintiff learned after the fact
that the determination of pendente lite custody arrangements has a very
substantial impact on permanent custody decisions, since courts prefer to avoid
imposing changes in custody arrangements and thus favor the status quo in
making custody determinations. In
making the above-described misrepresentation, Mr. Olmsted intended to, and did
in fact, harm Plaintiff’s legal interests and interfered with the court’s
furtherance of the best interests of Joshua in determining the permanent
custody award.
18. On July 11, 1997, the
hearing on pendente lite custody arrangements was conducted by Master Amy J.
Bragunier (“Master Bragunier”, hereinafter) of the Circuit Court for Charles
County. During the course of the hearing, conduct and communications by and
between Master Bragunier and Mr. Olmsted reflected the existence of prior ex
parte communications between them regarding the subject domestic litigation.
During and subsequent to the above-referenced hearing, the tone and tenor of
Master Bragunier’s communications to Plaintiff as well as her body language and
facial expressions evidenced an unwarranted and unprovoked hostility toward
Plaintiff. Master Bragunier granted
nearly every motion presented by Mr. Olmsted, including motions that were
unwarranted by the facts in the matters before the court and the applicable and
controlling Maryland custody law.
19. During the course of the
pendente lite custody
hearing Master Bragunier denied Plaintiff access to
relevant evidence and the right to
present witnesses. She was openly biased and hostile. Nothing Plaintiff said mattered. Master Bragunier
"stepped down off the bench" and acted as Plaintiff's adversary. She
clearly acted in concert with Mr. Olmsted to deprive pro se Plaintiff of his
constitutionally protected rights to be heard on the issue of temporary
custody.
20. On information and belief, Master Bragunier and
Mr. Olmsted engaged in ex parte
communications about the case
prior to the pendente lite custody
hearing.
21. On
August 1, 1997 in her findings and recommendations that followed the subject
hearing, Master Bragunier recommended that Joshua be placed in the custody of
Blake, even though the evidence established that Ms. Blake was an abusive and
neglectful mother, who ` in a house where other adults used unlawful drugs,
including crack cocaine, and abused alcohol.
Contrary to the state and/or local rules dictating that the final
hearings are set by the Assignment Office upon application by a litigant,
Master Bragunier announced that she set the final hearing in the Roginsky
matter before a circuit court judge for December 29, 1997. Master Bragunier did not inquire whether the
date was acceptable to the parties and Mr. Olmsted did not consult his schedule
to verify his availability for that day.
Upon information and belief the date was a result of prior ex parte
communications that involved Master Bragunier and Mr. Olmsted.
22. Plaintiff filed Exceptions
to Master Bragunier’s above-described findings and recommendations in
accordance with Maryland Rules §§ 2-541(i) and 9-206(g), which require that such
Exceptions be the subject of a review by a judge of the Circuit Court. A local rule and/or general or standing
order of the Circuit Court for Charles County mandates that the Exceptions to
the recommendations of a Special Master for Domestic Relations are to be
reviewed by the judge assigned duties as chambers judge on the week of the
filing of the exceptions, who in Jacob Roginsky’s case was Circuit Court Judge
Steven G. Chappelle. In violation of
the command and spirit of the above-described local rule and/or general or
standing order and outside of her official capacity, Master Bragunier placed a
note in the court file of the subject case instructing the clerks to direct
Plaintiff’s above referenced Exceptions to her findings and recommendations to Judge
Nalley. This unlawful act interfered
with the due administration of the court process. On information and belief,
the acts complained of herein were perpetrated in furtherance of a conspiracy
to deny pro se Plaintiff due process. Soon after, Ms. Blake, arrogantly boasted
to pro se Plaintiff that Mr. Olmsted "fixed" the proceedings as she
had predicted months earlier, meaning that Mr. Olmsted had corruptly procured
and/or effected an unlawful and unjust outcome, by arranging for Master Bragunier
to specially assign pro se Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky’s exceptions to Judge
Nalley.
23.
Judge Nalley denied the Exceptions without affording Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky a
hearing. Judge Nalley took upon himself
to review and deny the Exceptions, rather than to allow the Exceptions to be
determined by the chambers judge.
24. In November of 1997,
Plaintiff discovered the note
by which Master Bragunier referred his
Exceptions to Judge
Nalley. Subsequently, Plaintiff wrote to Master Bragunier and requested
that she cite the legal authority she had relied on in referring his exceptions
to Judge Nalley. Although the Plaintiff
had written the letter to Master Bragunier and not to Judge Nalley, Judge
Nalley responded to the letter. In his response Judge Nalley stated that Master
Bragunier must have acted at his direction, and that he had so directed her in
order to expedite disposition of cases. Judge Nalley’s response thus implied
that his directive to Master Bragunier concerned all cases assigned to Master
Bragunier, yet none of the files for the other cases heard by Master Bragunier
during the 30-day period centered on the day of the Plaintiff’s hearing before
Master Bragunier contained such a note.
On information and belief, only the Plaintiff’s Exceptions were referred
by Master Bragunier to Judge Nalley. In
the alternative, only the Plaintiff’s Exceptions and those of other parties
whose were opponents of Mr. Olmsted’s clients were referred by Master Bragunier
to Judge Nalley. On information and belief, Judge Nalley and Master Bragunier
discussed ex parte the placing of the aforesaid note in the file.
25. On
information and belief, Judge Nalley and Master Bragunier discussed ex parte,
Plaintiff’s Exceptions and the underlying case in which Plaintiff and Ms. Blake
were parties. On information and
belief, Master Bragunier and Judge Nalley had ex parte communications, the
content of which was never revealed to Plaintiff, that influenced and/or
supported Judge Nalley’s denial of Plaintiff’s Exceptions. Judge Nalley’s above-described response to
Plaintiff’s letter to Master Bragunier was misleading and intended by Judge
Nalley to be misleading. Judge Nalley’s above-described letter was intended to
conceal the fact that Plaintiff’s above-described Exceptions were treated
differently than those of other, similarly situated litigants. Judge Nalley’s
above-described letter was intended to conceal the fact of Judge Nalley’s
improper bias and hostility and total absence of impartiality towards
Plaintiff.
26. Because of his bias and hostility toward Plaintiff, Judge Nalley should have recused himself from addressing the merits of Plaintiff’s above-described Exceptions.
27. Master Bragunier denied
Plaintiff's requests for a
short delay to obtain a transcript of
the prior ex parte
hearing before Master Bragunier. The aforesaid transcript
would have shown that Ms. Blake
testified falsely in the ex
parte
hearing. The court reporter from whom Plaintiff sought to purchase the subject
transcript informed Plaintiff that Judge Nalley had forbidden him from working
on the subject transcript. This action by Judge Nalley was perpetrated by him
while he was acting solely in his administrative capacity, as a superior of the
court reporter, and not in Judge Nalley’s judicial capacity. Judge Nalley acted as aforesaid with malice
and ill will toward Plaintiff, and with the intention of interfering with
Plaintiff’s vindication of his legal and constitutional rights. On information
and belief Judge Nalley acted in this respect in concert with Mr. Olmsted and
Master Bragunier. The transcript that
the reporter provided to Plaintiff after the pendente lite hearing was
significantly altered. Absent from the
transcript was Plaintiff’s testimony that Mr. Olmsted offered him prior to the
hearing to withdraw the Defendant’s claim that she was threatened by Plaintiff
in exchange for a promise of financial support. Absent from the transcript was
also Plaintiff’s testimony that Mr. Olmsted admitted to Plaintiff his knowledge
that Plaintiff defended Joshua in 1996 from Defendant when she threatened to
kill Joshua and Plaintiff with a screwdriver, and that according to Olmsted the
Defendant told him she lost control in anger but did not mean to carry out the
threat. The transcript was missing
parts of witnesses testimony as to Defendant’s negligent care of Joshua and
widely misquoted other parts of witnesses’ testimony. Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that Mr. Olmsted and/or
Judge Nalley induced the reporter to
alter the transcript.
28. Contrary to established administrative procedures of the Circuit Court for Charles County which requires the Assignment Office to schedule merits hearings before the respective judges of the Court, Master Bragunier set the merits hearing in Plaintiff’s case(s) before Judge Nalley, for December 29, 1997. This was done in furtherance of a conspiracy among Master Bragunier, Judge Nalley and Mr. Olmsted to deny Plaintiff a full, fair and impartial hearing before a different judge. Mr. Olmsted, Master Bragunier, and Judge Nalley conspired to award custody of his son to Defendant Blake. .
29. In early September, 1997,
Plaintiff retained
Patricia N. Drummond, an attorney
admitted to practice law in Maryland, as his new counsel in the subject
domestic
litigation. Ms. Drummond was then a
partner in the law firm of Drummond & O’Brien, Upper Marlborough,
Maryland. Ms. Drummond informed
Plaintiff that Master Bragunier's note directing his exceptions to Judge Nalley
violated pertinent court rules. Ms. Drummond told Plaintiff also that the case
was fixed, and that Mr. Olmsted’s father, Frank Olmsted, Esquire, is an old
friend of Judge Nalley and that Judge Nalley treats all of Olmsted &
Olmsted’s clients preferentially. Ms. Drummond
also told Plaintiff that Judge
Nalley routinely engages in ex parte communications with local attorneys and
treats the clients of a selected number of attorneys differently. Ms. Drummond told Plaintiff that she was
informed of Judge Nalley’s additional animus toward Plaintiff based on Plaintiff
being Jewish and being married to a Black woman. Plaintiff's rights were compromised by these acts of judicial
collusion by Mr. Olmsted and Judge Nalley’s prejudice toward Plaintiff.
30. To be retained, Drummond
promised Plaintiff to ask
Judge Nalley to recuse himself, pursue
aggressive discovery and
seek an out-of-county guardian ad litem
for Joshua. Instead, Ms. Drummond failed to seek Judge Nalley’s
disqualification or
recusal; nor did she conduct any
discovery. To explain her lack of zealous representation, Ms. Drummond told
Plaintiff on several occasions that the discovery would be a waste of time and
resources because Judge Nalley had already decided the merits. Drummond said the only thing Plaintiff had
left to do is to impress Judge Nalley that “he is a good guy” so that Judge
Nalley would go easier on him. Had Drummond conducted discovery as promised,
evidence would have been available from discovery to show that Ms. Blake was an
unfit parent, an emotionally unstable mother and a prolific perjurer. Drummond
said that even if such evidence had been developed in discovery, it would not
matter because Judge Nalley had already made up his mind. Drummond told
Plaintiff she was moving her practice to Charles County and would seek election
to the position of State’s Attorney for Charles County. Drummond stated she
needed to develop a friendship with Judge Nalley to have a successful practice
there and keep on good terms with the local lawyers to be elected. Ms. Drummond repeatedly informed Plaintiff
that she could not represent Plaintiff zealously because doing so would
alienate Judge Nalley and Master Bragunier whose support Drummond said she
needed for the success of her bid for the office of the State’s Attorney and
for the success of her law practice in Charles County, where she was moving her
practice at the time. Drummond told
Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky that Mr. Olmstead had spread rumors about Plaintiff in
the local Charles County legal community.
Drummond said also Judge Nalley communicated his dislike of Plaintiff to
others in the legal community and that because of these rumors and
communications, Plaintiff could not find a local attorney who would represent
him. Subsequently Plaintiff again tried
and indeed was unable to find legal representation in Charles County. She said Judge Nalley was going to teach
Plaintiff a lesson for calling Mr. Olmstead "unscrupulous" and Master
Bragunier “unenlightened”. In mid
December, 1997, Plaintiff informed Drummond that he considered suing Mr.
Olmsted, Master Bragunier and Judge Nalley, and to file disciplinary complaints
against Mr. Olmsted and Judge Nalley.
31.
Plaintiff also informed Drummond that an attorney had told him that he had a
good chance of prevailing on appeal in light of the facts of the case: Ms.
Blake lived (with Joshua) in a house with convicted felons, whose convictions
included substance abuse, and where the presence of pets and heavy cigarette
smoke seriously exacerbated Joshua’s pre-asthmatic condition and allergies; Ms. Blake did not work or study; Master
Bragunier had placed an illegal note in the file to direct Plaintiff’s
Exceptions to Judge Nalley; and there was extensive evidence of bias against
the Plaintiff. Plaintiff also informed
Drummond that he planned to use another attorney for the appeal.
32. Until approximately two
weeks before the scheduled for December 29, 1997 merits hearing on permanent
custody of Joshua, child support and division of marital assets, Drummond told
Plaintiff on a number of occasions that the hearing was set before Judge
Nalley. However, one week before the
hearing she told Plaintiff that the hearing needed to be rescheduled because it
was allegedly set before a Domestic Relations Master, who she said could not
address the custody issues due to an informal limit of two hours on the length
of hearings before the Masters. Ms.
Drummond said she and Mr. Olmsted would ask for a brief continuance – not to
exceed one month – and during that time she would move to recuse Judge Nalley
or get the case assigned to another judge.
Mr. Olmsted and Drummond filed a joint motion to postpone the hearing.
33.
The
motion was fraudulent as a deputy clerk from the
masters’ office told Plaintiff that the
hearing had been set before Judge Nalley and not before a Special Master, and
she, i.e., the clerk from the Masters’ office, had been present at the pendente
lite custody hearing when Master Bragunier had set the hearing on permanent
custody arrangements and marital support issues for December 29th before Judge
Nalley; the Masters’ office confirmed there had been no masters’ hearings set
for December 29, 1997; the trial had been scheduled to consume a full day, and
masters heard cases planned for not more than two hours; one of the grounds for
the continuance was that Dr. Lewis, a court appointed psychologist had not
completed evaluations of the parties and Joshua, yet by then he had already had
more sessions with the Roginsky family than he has in court-ordered evaluations
and had specifically informed Plaintiff at a session in early December that his
report was nearly ready, and no new issues in the evaluation had arisen since;
Drummond told Plaintiff on a number of occasions that the December 29th hearing
was set before Judge Nalley; Judge Nalley’s schedule for December 29th proved
very light, and a circuit court clerk told Plaintiff the lightness of schedule
appeared to be a result of the cancellation of a long hearing before Judge
Nalley; and missing from the court file is the notice of the hearing of
December 29, 1997, which reflects the courtroom in which the hearing was to be
conducted, which would identify the judge assigned to preside at the
hearing.
34.
Plaintiff requested a schedule of cases to be heard on December 29, 1998 by the
Domestic Relations Masters and was told there were no masters’ hearings that
day and none were scheduled previously.
For all of the foregoing reasons it is clear that the merits hearing in
Plaintiff’s case had been first improperly scheduled before Judge Nalley for
December 29, 1997 and then fraudulently continued.
35. On December 29, 1997, the
day of the rescheduled hearing, Judge Nalley granted the motion for
continuance,
knowing that it was fraudulent because
he knew that he was scheduled to preside at the hearing, but the joint motion
said the hearing “is scheduled for a hearing before the Master of Domestic
Relations on Monday, December 29, 1997.”
Judge Nalley rescheduled the hearing before himself, even though the
case had not officially been assigned to him theretofore by random draw,
whereas in the Circuit Court for Charles County it is the assignment office
that normally assigns judges to hear continued cases.
36.
On information and belief the aforementioned continuance was solely to give
Defendant Blake, who did not work or attend school, and who lived in a criminal
setting, harmful to Joshua’s environment with drugs and cigarette smoke more
time to move out of that house and get a job in order to strengthen her
position on custody, since Olmsted knew that Plaintiff would appeal any
decision that would grant custody of Joshua to Ms. Blake. Indeed, subsequently Mr. Olmsted succeeded
in persuading Blake to move out of the crack house and get a part-time job,
which, while it only marginally improved Joshua’s situation, it helped Blake to
create the appearance that she had some parenting credentials. The continuance proved to be more than a
year long. Plaintiff’s conversations with Ms. Drummond showed, as stated above,
that the sole purpose for the continuance was to provide Ms. Blake more time to
move out of the crack house and get a part-job so as to strengthen her position
vis-a-vis custody, which was also strengthened
by the continuation of custody pendente lite.
37. In
July of 1998, before the rescheduled merits
hearing, Plaintiff attempted to fire
Ms. Drummond. At that
point, Ms. Drummond promised to conduct
discovery for the next hearing.
Plaintiff agreed to the conditions, but three months later Ms. Drummond
had done nothing.
38. On 2/9/98 upon a
motion filed by Ms. Drummond
on behalf of Plaintiff, Judge Nalley
appointed attorney John F. Mudd as the
guardian ad litem for Joshua. At the
time
of the appointment it was well known in
the local law bar that Mudd was (and is) a close friend of Judge Nalley and Mr.
Olmsted's father.
39. On
March 22, 1999 Judge Nalley entered a Final Judgment of Absolute Divorce in
favor of Blake. Throughout these proceedings Judge Nalley, in collusion with
Mr. Olmsted and others, acted to deprive the Plaintiffs of a full and fair
opportunity to be heard before a fair and impartial tribunal. This is
established, inter alia by the degree of familiarity between Mr. Olmsted, and
Judge Nalley as demonstrated by Judge Nalley addressing Mr. Olmsted by his
first name, “Bill”, on the record during the hearings on permanent custody and
marital support issues.
40.
Plaintiff was able to identify from the Circuit Court’s electronic records all
domestic cases in which Mr. Olmsted served as counsel of record during the
calendar years 1996 through 1998, and part of 1999. Plaintiff then reviewed the court’s file for each such case. Plaintiff found a number of other cases, in
addition to his case, where parties were represented by Mr. Olmsted and Judge
Nalley would re-assign those cases to himself.
Plaintiff found that a majority of Mr. Olmsted’s merits hearing were
assigned to Judge Nalley. The
probability of a random distribution of assignments as that which Plaintiff
observed with the lopsided distribution of Mr. Olmsted’s cases is less that 1
in 10,000. Throughout these draconian proceedings
Judge Nalley in collusion with “Bill”, acted to deprive the plaintiffs of a
full and fair opportunity to be heard before a fair and impartial tribunal. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136(1955).
41. On
November 24, 1998, and January 29, 1999 Plaintiff, represented himself at
evidentiary hearings on the substantive merits, core and fundamental issues of
permanent custody of Joshua, and other marital issues before Judge Nalley. Plaintiff was deprived of a full and fair
opportunity to present clear and convincing evidence:
(a)
of
pervasive judicial case assignment manipulation by
“Bill” Olmsted, Master Bragunier and Judge Nalley, suppor- ted by court records and the testimony of clerical staff;
(b)
of
pervasive ex parte contacts between “Bill” Olmsted and the Court;
(c)
that
“Bill” Olmsted suborned perjury of Defendant Blake;
(d)
that
Defendant Blake is emotionally unstable and should not be awarded custody of
Joshua on the basis of professional norms and standards;
(e)
that
Defendant Blake had committed numerous perjuries and that the outcome of the
case was fixed by “Bill” Olmsted;
(f)
of
extrinsic fraud upon the Court, supported by audio recordings surreptitiously
taken by Plaintiff in the office of psychologist Dr. James Lewis, a close
friend of Master Brajunier, who appointed him, that establishes Lewis willfully
fabricated the factual contents of his interview notes, and then falsified the
facts in his report to the Court on matters related to the parent-child relationship
regarding core issues of custody;
(g)
of
extrinsic fraud upon the court by Lewis to conceal the damning results of the
MMPI Test that he conducted on Blake and lying that he conducted no such test;
(h)
that
guardian ad litem John F. Mudd, upon learning from Plaintiff that Dr.Lewis had
committed extrinsic fraud upon the Court, breached his duty to undertake an
independent investigation of Plaintiff’s allegations, and take appropriate
corrective action on behalf of Joshua in proceedings before his friend Judge
Nalley;
(i)
Of Lewis’ ex parte letter to Nalley,
saying he would not appear at the November 24, 1998 hearing to which he was
subpoenaed by Plaintiff, of Nalley’s concealment of this letter until after the
November 24, 1998 hearing and of Nalley quashing the subpoena that Plaintiff
issued to Lewis to appear at the January 29, 1999 hearing.
(j)
of a
biased tribunal and Nalley’s deliberately spreading rumors that he disliked
Plaintiff, signaling to the local attorneys that representing Plaintiff could
damage one’s career in Charles County -- and cronyism traceable to the
longstanding relationships of Nalley, Olmsted, Bragunier, Lewis and Mudd and
their families;
(k)
of
other improprieties in handling of the Roginsky domestic litigation at the
Charles County Courthouse.
42. Mr. Olmsted called Plaintiff a couple of days
after the hearing, in January of 1999, and said Judge Nalley had
underestimated child support by $300 per
month and that he
intended to speak to the judge about this on
the following day.
Plaintiff told Mr. Olmsted that he would not
consent to any ex parte contacts between Mr. Olmsted and Judge Nalley, who had
already left Plaintiff with less than $700 per month to live on. Mr. Olmsted and Plaintiff agreed to call
Judge Nalley together next day. But the
next day Mr. Olmsted telephoned Plaintiff and said he stopped earlier in the
day by Judge Nalley’s chambers and secured the $300/month increase. Mr. Olmsted said he told Judge Nalley that
Plaintiff forbade Mr. Olmsted to communicate ex parte with Judge Nalley on the
issue of the increase, but that Judge Nalley told him not to mind Plaintiff’s
objection and just to convey Plaintiff Judge Nalley’s decision. From Plaintiff’s imme-diate reaction and
subsequent communications with Mr. Olmsted, Mr. Olmsted understood that
Plaintiff would complain about the ex
parte communication and would present it as an issue on appeal. Mr. Olmsted then submitted a memorandum to
Judge Nalley in which he asserted, with knowing and patent falsity, that
Plaintiff had consented to the ex parte communication described
above. It was Judge Nalley’s
responsibility to take or initiate corrective action against Mr. Olmsted for
the fraudulent memoran-dum, yet he did not do that. Instead, Judge Nalley took part in the fraud by accepting the
memorandum and acting upon it.
43. During oral argument on Plaintiff’s
subsequent appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals sharply questioned Mr.
Olmsted concerning his ex parte communications with Judge Nalley and
their unduly informal courtroom exchanges.
The appellate court overturned the indefinite alimony and Judge Nalley’s other financial rulings. The
Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission found Mr. Olmsted in violation of
professional rules of ethics and issued a “unpublished reprimand” to him.
44. Mr. Olmsted engaged in ex parte
contacts with Judge
Nalley to deprive Plaintiff of his right to
be heard under due
process. Some of the ex parte
communications were acknowledged by