UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Jacob Roginsky, )

PLAINTIFF ) CIVIL DOCKET NO. )

v. )

) VERIFIED

Veronica V. Blake, ) COMPLAINT

William F. Olmsted, Esquire, )

Law Office of Olmsted & Olmsted, )

Mary Sue Greisman, Esquire, ) TRIAL BY JURY

Law Offices of Greisman & Carroll, ) DEMANDED

Patricia N. Drummond, Esquire, )

Law Offices of Drummond & O’Brian, )

James E. Lewis, Ph.D, )

Psychology & Education Associates, )

Honorable Amy J. Bragunier, individually )

and in her official capacity, )

Honorable Robert C. Nalley, individually )

and in his official capacity, )

JOINTLY, SEVERALLY AND INDIVIDUALLY )

DEFENDANTS )

________________________________________________________________)

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

COMES NOW Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky and files this Complaint and moves this court for trial by jury against Defendants as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Plaintiff relies on the authority of Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution

extending the judicial power of the United States to cases arising under the federal constitution. This court has original jurisdiction over the events and people complained of herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 in that a) Federal Question exists, b) The action is civil in nature and is seeking Monetary, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. The suit is brought under 42 USC 1983, 1985, 1986 and pendent state law. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted in conspiracy under color of law and employed extrinsic fraud, artifice and misrepresentation to deny Plaintiff his rights, including but not limited to the rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution and a natural right (also a Ninth Amendment right) to defend one’s child and oneself from illegal attempts by others to destroy their future.

2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 Venue is proper in the District of Maryland in that the

violations complained of herein have occurred in the State of Maryland and all defendants reside in the State of Maryland.

3. Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky claims diversity jurisdiction with regard to all Defendants.

4. Plaintiff avers that this complaint would be improperly placed in the Courts of the state of

Maryland. Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer injury unless this Court grants the relief requested herein.

POINTS AND AUTHORITY

5. An addendum of points and authority, styled “ADDENDUM OF POINTS AND

AUTHORITY …” is made part of this complaint. Its Section I addresses a) the availability of declaratory and injunctive relief against judicial officials acting in their judicial capacity for violation of rights of citizens b) the availability of money damages relief against judicial officials for violations of citizens’ rights while acting outside of their jurisdiction, or in their administrative or ministerial capacity. Section II provides a discussion and citation of case law in support of Plaintiff’s assertion that the matter at hand belongs in federal court and that no federal abstention doctrines apply to it. Section III contains Plaintiff’s argument challenging the Constitutionality of Maryland statute CJA, Section 10-405 on the basis that its indiscriminate language admits of applications that deny citizens their Constitutional rights and offend the intelligence and sense of justice of the civilized person. In Section IV Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the unrecorded court ordered psychological evaluations as a loophole practice undermining the democratic principles of the open courts.

6. Plaintiff incorporates Exhibit 0 and its auxiliary Exhibits 1-36 into this complaint in order

to expound on- and substantiate the allegations contained herein. Should the reader find the clarity and totality of Plaintiff’s allegations within the body of this document sufficient to support the counts enumerated in it, he/she might consider not spending time at the initial juncture on reviewing said exhibits.

PARTIES

7. Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky resides at 5317 Thompson Hill Road, King George VA 22485.

He Is employed as a scientist with the United States Department of Defense.

8. Defendant Blake is a natural person residing at 3002 Gallery Place, Apt. 14,Waldorf, MD

20604.

9. Defendant William F. Olmsted is an attorney admitted to practice law in the State of

Maryland. He has a usual place of business at 201 Howard St, La Plata, Md. 20646.

10. Defendant Olmsted & Defendant Olmsted, PC is a law firm of which Defendant Olmsted

is a co-owner and employee.

11. Defendant Greisman is an attorney admitted to practice law in the State of Maryland. She

has a usual place of business at 11750 Business Park Drive, Waldorf, Md. 20601.

12. Defendant Greisman & Carroll, PC is a law firm of which Defendant Greisman is a co

owner and employee. It is located at 11750 Business Park Drive, Waldorf, Md. 20601.

13. Defendant Patricia N. Drummond is an attorney admitted to practice law in the State of

Maryland. She has a usual place of business at 14718 Main Street, Upper Marlboro, Md.20772.

14. Drummond & O’Brian, PC is a law firm of which Defendant Drummond is a co-owner

and employee.

15. Dr. James E. Lewis is a clinical psychologist. He has a usual place of business at 9135

Piscataway Rd., Suite 305, Clinton, Md. 20735.

16. Psychology & Education Associates is a company of which Defendant James E. Lewis is

the owner and an employee. It is based and operated in Clinton, Maryland.

17. Defendant Amy J. Bragunier is a special master for domestic relations for the

Circuit Court for Charles County, Maryland.

18. Defendant Robert C. Nalley is the Administrative Judge of the Circuit Court for Charles

County, Maryland.

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

19. This is a proceeding to redress grievances under Federal Civil Rights Statues and pendant

common law jurisdiction against participants in state court litigation in which egregious violations of due process and equal protection of the law occurred.

20. Plaintiff asserts that there are no effective state remedies available to him and asks the

court to invoke its jurisdiction under the Supremacy Clause and other applicable law, including Title 42 U.S. Code §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 over the parties and events complained of herein.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND CAUSES OF ACTION

21. At all times relevant hereto Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky has enjoyed the rights of an

American citizen, including but not limited to the right to due process of the law and equal protection of the law.

22. Since the Plaintiff’s marriage to Defendant Blake on December 30, 1993 she had been an

unreliable and unhelpful wife and an irresponsible, often abusive mother to the couple’s child Joshua Michael Roginsky, born on July 26, 1994. The defendant’s treatment of the child was so disagreeable to the Plaintiff that he had to hire full time babysitter since the child was less than six months old, even though the defendant did not work.

23. Defendant Blake told Plaintiff she had suffered from mental disorders and was once

hospitalized with a psychiatric illness in her native Jamaica. The defendant’s mother is a paranoid schizophrenic who is in and out of psychiatric institutions.

24. Plaintiff and Defendant Blake were receiving family counseling several months before the

birth of Joshua. The psychologist told the Defendant she needed to be treated for depression and possibly other underlying conditions. The Defendant refused treatment and the sessions stopped.

25. Starting in 1993 and for the next five years the fall of the Soviet Empire resulted in

rampant RIFs of scientists at the American naval laboratories. As a theoretical nuclear physicist working at the Naval Research Laboratory Plaintiff felt particularly vulnerable since theoretical research suffered the most. Plaintiff explained the situation to Defendant Blake many a time. He begged her to seek psychiatric counseling so that she could get a job or learn to be patient with Joshua and stay with him, eliminating the drain of over $500/month on the babysitters. The defendant threatened to take Joshua to Jamaica if Plaintiff continued to “pressure her.”.

26. Worried about his employment, Plaintiff attempted to open a motorcycle rental business

in Jamaica with two partners, of which one was an American relative of Defendant Blake). Defendant Blake refused to help Plaintiff and the partners with the business in the least.

27. Unable to tolerate Defendant Blake any longer, in January of 1996 Plaintiff separated

from her and lived in a room in Riverdale, Md, spending all of his free time with Joshua.

28. After receiving on July 5 1996 a RIF notice, Plaintiff could not continue to pay in excess

of $2,000/mo to Defendant Blake, including over $1,000/month for her Alexandria apartment. Unsure of what Defendant Blake would do, Plaintiff did not tell of his loss of employment. He considered offering Defendant Blake to visit with her family in Jamaica for a couple of months and help with the motorcycle business. Plaintiff knew the defendant would stay with her sister, who appeared to be a caring mother to her children. Plaintiff spoke with the sister by phone and was assured she would take excellent care of Joshua if he visited the island with the Defendant.

29. In mid August of 1996 Defendant Blake left with Joshua for Jamaica. During her 2,5-

month stay there she destroyed the business. The manager quit in disgust within weeks after the defendant’s arrival, writing to Plaintiff “… I’ve never dealt with a crazy, stupid, idiotic woman like your wife. I am out of here. Good luck! …”

30. Plaintiff learned later that Defendant Blake spent most of the time on the island

romancing her former boyfriend, cruising with him on the company motorcycles and ignoring the business altogether. Joshua was practically all the time with his aunt.

31. With the business manager gone, the partners asked Defendant Blake to liquidate the

business. She sold only one motorcycle and deposited the money into a an account she opened with her sister in Jamaica. Defendant Blake refused to return the money to the company until Plaintiff and one of his partners (Defendant Blake’s relative) threatened her with a suit.

32. By early October of 1996 Plaintiff secured employment with the Naval Surface Warfare

Center in Dahlgren, Va.

33. Defendant Blake returned to the US on October 30, 1999 and Plaintiff placed her in his

temporary (paid for by the navy) apartment in Waldorf, Maryland.

34. For three days following her return Defendant Blake was talking to herself in Jamaican

Patois and constantly provoking and threatening Plaintiff, who spent almost all of his time with the child, afraid to leave him with the semi-delirious defendant and not having found a babysitter at the new location. On November 2, 1996 she told Plaintiff she used to hate Joshua and had almost lost him. When Plaintiff demanded that Defendant Blake explains what she meant by “almost lost him,.” the defendant physically attacked Plaintiff.

35. After Plaintiff subdued Defendant Blake he picked up crying 2.5-year-old Joshua and

tried to carry him out of the apartment.

36. Defendant Blake confronted Plaintiff and Joshua with a screw driver and then assaulted

them with it screaming “I will kill you and then I will kill Joshua.” Defendant lunged at Plaintiff and the child several times.

37. Plaintiff backed into the kitchen with Joshua in his one arm, fending the defendant off

with the other. He grabbed a knife and ordered Defendant Blake to stop. When she did, he called the police asking to take Defendant Blake to a psychiatric facility.

38. A police officer who arrived at the scene deprived Plaintiff of any opportunity to explain

the reason for his call, disregarded the obvious evidence of what had happened and arrested Plaintiff before the screaming and terrified child. (A federal suit has been filed against the police officer.)

39. Subsequently Defendant Blake blackmailed Plaintiff, threatening to testify against him at

the assault hearing unless he met her unreasonable financial demands.

40. In March of 1997 the charges against Plaintiff were “nolle prossed,” and at no time did a

criminal conviction enter against Plaintiff.

41. Since December of 1996 Joshua resided primarily (~ 5 days a week) with Plaintiff. A

live-in babysitter was hired to take care of Joshua while Plaintiff was at work. During the same period of time Plaintiff provided full support for Defendant Blake, who refused to become meaningfully employed. Plaintiff was unable to induce Defendant Blake to move out of the house where she lived even though there was rampant drug and alcohol abuse and heavy cigarette smoking – a totally unacceptable environment for Joshua who had had respiratory problems since his infancy and was diagnosed with sleep apnea and had a pre-asthmatic condition.

42. In late March of 1997 Plaintiff informed Defendant Blake of his intention to gradually

lower her support and expectation that within six months she would become meaningfully employed. Plaintiff also said she had to move out of the crack house in which she lived so that Joshua would not spend two days a week surrounded with drugs and cigarette smoke.

43. The next day on the advice of her new counsel, Defendant Olmsted, Defendant Blake

instituted a false and malicious ex parte process against Plaintiff seeking a restraining order against him and removal of Joshua from his care. Defendant Blake provided an affidavit claiming in part that she tape recorded Plaintiff repeatedly threatening to kill her. It is noteworthy that Defendant Blake characterized Plaintiff, whose hair is brown and skin is pale as

a person with blond hair and brown skin.

44. Without notice or a hearing Plaintiff was deprived of certain liberties and the right to

contest all decisions made as to the custody of his minor son Joshua. Under color of law and custom Plaintiff was deprived of the companionship of his son.

45. At the beginning of the hearing Judge Chappelle informed Plaintiff Jacob Roginsky that.

he could discuss a possible settlement with Defendant Olmsted if he wished.

46. Plaintiff and Defendant Olmsted met alone for several minutes. During the meeting

Defendant Olmsted told Plaintiff that Defendant Blake would withdraw her accusations in exchange for his promise of undiminished financial support. Plaintiff flatly declined the offer telling Defendant Olmsted his act smelled of extortion.

47. During the hearing Defendants Blake lied that Plaintiff had four guns and was capable of

murder. Defendant Olmsted argued Plaintiff’s attitude in the courtroom suggested the same. Both defendants told surreal stories of Plaintiff stalking Defendant Blake and her morbid fear of him.

48. Plaintiff asked Defendant Blake to produce the recording with his threats to kill her. She

said the recorder ran out of tape before the threats, contradicting the affidavit where she claimed she prepared the recorder before calling Plaintiff and that the threats came early into the conversation. Plaintiff proved she committed other perjuries at the hearing as well.

49. The Court denied Defendant Blake’s request to continue the restraining order with

the declaration that the petitioner was attempting to “fit square pegs into the round holes”. Nevertheless, Plaintiff suffered significantly from his separation with Joshua and the worries over the potential vagaries of the trial.

After the hearing Defendant Olmsted offered Plaintiff to come to his office where he would “act as a neutral party” (a suspect role for a party’s counsel) to help Plaintiff and Defendant Blake work out an agreement on temporary support of Defendant Blake and custody of Joshua.

50. Defendant Olmsted violated his promise to be neutral during the April 14, 1997 meeting.

Instead, he and Defendant Blake blackmailed Plaintiff and attempted to extort money from him with threats that Defendant Blake would move with Joshua to Jamaica..

51. Plaintiff requested that Blake immediately starts to look for a different residence since her

place was harmful and dangerous to Joshua. He offered to pay for Defendant Blake’s move to a comparable in size clean place. Defendants Olmsted and Blake continued to be rude to Plaintiff.

52. Plaintiff got up and prepared to leave when Defendant Blake started insulting him about

his appearance. Defendant Olmsted immediately offered Plaintiff to see Joshua for ½ day, saying Joshua was almost cured of the skin condition he began suffering at Defendant Blake’s place so the two could have fun going somewhere. Defendant Olmsted told Plaintiff on the phone two days before that Joshua looked fine in his office in the morning of the same day.

53. Defendant Olmsted deliberately misled Plaintiff about Joshua’s condition. Plaintiff

obtained a copy of Joshua’s chart for the day when Defendant Olmsted saw Joshua in his office, indicating the condition of Joshua’s face and eyes was rather serious that day.

54. Joshua arrived to Plaintiff around noon time of April 14, 1997. He appeared notably sick

with his face covered in rashes and scratches and eyes full of puss. Defendant Blake handed Plaintiff a paper to sign that Joshua was ok at the time. Outraged Plaintiff carried the child into his apartment and asked the live-in babysitter to call around and see if a doctor could see the child that day. She could not get an appointment with any doctor until the next day.

55. Plaintiff at the time lived minutes from the courthouse. Plaintiff visited the circuit and

district court criminal clerk’s office to check if the landlady had any criminal history; Plaintiff knew she babysat Joshua and had seen her getting in her car drunk with little children. It turned out the landlady had been criminally prosecuted for assault and battery and at a different time for criminal telephone misuse. He also learned additional information about her son’s multiple prosecutions for drug possession, use and distribution and for robbery and other crimes. Plaintiff reviewed the criminal file of the landlady’s daughter, who had been found guilty of robbery and had a history of drug abuse. Plaintiff found pages of criminal prosecution of the landlady’s estranged husband.

56. After the courthouse Plaintiff visited and retained Defendant Greisman, Esquire for the

purpose of zealously and competently protecting his son’s and his rights.

57. The condition of Joshua’s eyes did not improve by the evening and Plaintiff took Joshua

to an emergency room. The doctor prescribed treatment for the child and strongly warned against returning him to the environment where the condition developed until Joshua saw a pediatric allergist. .

58. On April 15 Plaintiff wrote a letter to Defendant Olmsted expressing dissatisfaction with

his “neutral mediation” and telling him of the medical condition in which he found Joshua and the new information he learned about the environment at Defendant Blake’s house. Plaintiff asked Defendant Olmsted to negotiate with Defendant Greisman a fair temporary child custody and support arrangement but warned that Joshua would not be returning to Defendant Blake’s residence until she moved out of the criminal environment.

59. Defendant Greisman neglected and failed to zealously and competently represent

Plaintiff. In spite of the numerous requests Plaintiff made to her (and to Defendant Olmsted when she was out of town) to negotiate temporary custody, visitation and support agreement and to stop Defendant Balke’s constant calculated provocations of Plaintiff and Joshua’s babysitter so that she could continue to visit the child at Plaintiff’s apartment, she did nothing. (Neither did Defendant Olmsted.) Instead, Defendant Greisman appeared preoccupied with building connections to Defendant Olmsted.

60. Defendant Blake bragged to Plaintiff on a number of occasions that Defendant Olmsted

fixed the future divorce and custody case. She deliberately refused to accept Plaintiff’s offer of help in moving out of the crack house and too avoided any talk about a fair temporary custody agreement, saying Defendant Olmsted forbade her to discuss anything with Plaintiff. She later stated at a deposition that Defendant Olmsted never told her about Plaintiff’s requests that he and Greisman negotiate a temporary custody and visitation agreement.

61. Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Greisman imploring her to establish a record of the

Defendant Blake and Olmsted refusing to discuss temporary custody of Joshua and relocation of Defendant Blake to a safer environment and to establish a record of Defendant Greisman requesting Defendant Olmsted to restrain his client form the constant provocations of Plaintiff which eventually made it impossible for Plaintiff to allow Defendant Blake in his apartment for fear that she would come out, scratch her face and then call the police to get Plaintiff arrested.

Plaintiff repeatedly wrote and told Defendant Greisman that Defendants Olmsted and Blake were deliberate in their avoidance of negotiations and provocations so as to use the fact that Defendant Blake was denied access to Joshua in the litigation (See Exhibit 2).

62. Defendant Greisman spoke in a sycophantic manner to Defendant Olmsted during

Plaintiff’s initial visit to her office when she him to notify of her entry into the case. She seemed overly excited about being in the same case with him. Plaintiff was surprised to hear Defendant Greisman badmouth another client of hers to Defendant Olmsted who from the conversation appeared to represent the client’s wife. Defendant Greisman was appeared preoccupied with the importance the three Olmsteds (Defendant Olmsted, his attorney brother and his father, Frank Olmsted, Esquire) projected in the legal community.

63. In spite of her original promise to request a psychiatric evaluation of Defendant Blake,

and Plaintiff’s several reminders Greisman failed to request such an evaluation even though she knew of the history of Defendant Blake, including her assault on Joshua and Plaintiff.

64. Defendant Greisman neglected and failed to zealously conduct discovery in the case

prejudging the custody issue. Defendant Greisman neglected and failed to return Plaintiff’s telephone calls and to consider the needs of Plaintiff and his minor son in the litigation, failing to pursue critical steps in the preparation of the Plaintiff’s case.

65. Defendant Greisman knew of the special health needs of the minor child and that the

house where Defendant Blake lived was occupied by dangerous substance abusers but failed to act to prevent his return to that house.

66. Defendant Greisman kept Plaintiff in the dark as to the legal procedures and hearings that

were supposed to take place as part of the divorce and custody litigation.

67. During the first appointment Defendant Greisman promised Plaintiff to immediately file

for a merits hearing. Within one month she lied that she filed for it. Two months later she admitted that she did not.

68. On June 10, 1997 Plaintiff fired Greisman asking her to withdraw from the case

immediately so that he could employ a successor counsel. The next day for the first time Defendant Greisman informed Plaintiff that a show cause hearing was scheduled in the case, but said nothing about its significance or purpose.

69. On or around June 17 Defendant Greisman was still officially in the case. Plaintiff

phoned and left a message for her that he located a successor counsel, Mr. Scott Bowling, president of the local bar association, who said he could not enter the case until Defendant Greisman was officially out of the case. Greisman subsequently relayed a message to Plaintiff that she did everything necessary to withdraw and it was up to the court to release her.

70. Several days before the Show Cause hearing Plaintiff phoned Greisman to find out why

she was still in. During the conversation Defendant Greisman said that Defendant Olmsted told her Plaintiff filed a mean complaint against her. Plaintiff assured Defendant Greisman he had no idea what she was talking about. It was then that she for the first time explained to Plaintiff the significance of the pendente lite hearing and that Joshua’s temporary and largely permanent custody would be decided there. This was contrary to Defendant Olmsted’s unsolicited representations to Jacob shortly after he fired Greisman that he had no reason to worry about the hearing because it would be a pure formality with little consequence for anybody or anything.

71. A day or two later Defendant Greisman filed the necessary withdrawal line with the court

which was signed two days before the hearing, leaving Plaintiff unrepresented.

72. Plaintiff later learned that Defendant Greisman filed for a Show Cause hearing two weeks

after Defendant Olmsted had already filed for the same. Defendant Greisman knew of Defendant Olmsted’s filing and yet she did the same in order to extract additional money from Plaintiff.

73. In court proceedings on July 11, 1997 Plaintiff represented himself in a hearing before

Defendant Bragunier.

74. Defendant Bragunier denied Plaintiff access to relevant evidence.

75. Defendant Bragunier failed to give Plaintiff a meaningful hearing and prevented him from

placing his witnesses on the stand.

76. Defendant Blake was proven to have committed numerous perjuries in the courtroom

(See, e.g. Exhibit 3, information pertaining to the July 11 and August 1 hearings).

77. Defendant Bragunier failed to give Plaintiffs testimony equal consideration as she gave to

the perjured testimony of Defendant Blake.

Defendant Bragunier failed to maintain impartiality during the proceeding. She made hostile facial expressions and rolled up her eyes when Plaintiff spoke in court. Defendant Bragunier gave significant weight to testimony of Defendant Blake even when it was clearly false.

78. Defendant Bragunier made a number of adverse findings before Plaintiff or any of his

witnesses had a chance to testify. Defendant Bragunier made a significant number of findings against Plaintiff to the extent that Plaintiff’s son’s physical well being was jeopardized.

79. Defendant Bragunier knowingly placed the minor child in a house with Defendant Blake

which was shared with substance abusers. Defendant Bragunier knowingly placed Plaintiff’s minor child in an environment that was harmful to his health and against the recommendations of the child’s physician.

80. Defendant Bragunier took it upon herself to set the merits hearing for Plaintiff and

Defendant Blake before Defendant Nalley for December 29, 1997 knowing that Defendant Nalley would deny Plaintiff his rights to due process of the law and equal protection of the law and for same purpose.

81. Defendant Bragunier engaged in ex parte communications with Defendant Olmsted

having agreed to the date for the merits hearing outside of the courtroom.

82. Defendant Bragunier conspired with Defendants Olmsted and Nalley to set up the hearing

before Defendant Nalley knowing he would deny Plaintiff his rights to due process of the law and equal protection of the law. All three knew that as a result of the deprivation the separation between Plaintiff and his son would continue, a liberty deprivation which they knew from the hearings would be excruciatingly painful for the child and Plaintiff. All three acted with malice.

83. Defendant Bragunier knew or had every reason to know that the deprivation of the rights

of Plaintiff to due process of the law and equal protection of the law would also result in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s property rights that would make his economic survival difficult.

84. Assignment of cases for trial is a function of the assignment office. Defendant Bragunier

acted in a non-judicial capacity when she set up Plaintiff’s merits hearing before Defendant Nalley. In her non-judicial capacity, as stated above, she intentionally, conspiratorially and with malice deprived Plaintiff of his Constitutional rights. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover against Defendant Bragunier for any damages that resulted from her corrupt act.

85. In the second part of August of 1997 Plaintiff located a note in the two court files

associated with his case, one for Veronica Blake-Roginsky v Jacob Roginsky and the other for Jacob Roginsky v Veronica Blake-Roginsky. The note was dated August 4, 1997 and was from Defendant Bragunier (See Exhibit 4). The note directed the clerks to “refer any exceptions” filed in the case to Defendant Nalley.

86. Plaintiff was informed by two circuit court clerks that the note was one of a kind and that

the exceptions at the courthouse were always reviewed by the chamber judges, whose chamber duties followed a rotation schedule. Plaintiff was told the same by a Masters’ Office clerk.

87. Defendant Bragunier acted completely outside of her scope of duties and powers by

placing the note in Plaintiff’s file.

88. Defendant Bragunier knew that Defendant Nalley would deny Plaintiff his rights and she

knew that such denial would result in extreme deprivations for Plaintiff and his son.

89. Defendant Bragunier acted in a non-judicial capacity, outside of her scope of duties,

corruptly and maliciously by placing the note in Plaintiff’s files.

90. On a few occasions Defendant Blake made references in conversations with Plaintiff to

her attorney having “fixed” the proceedings and on one occasion she made a statement suggestive of possible payoffs.

91. Defendant Nalley accepted Defendant Bragunier’s recommendations and orders without

giving Plaintiff an opportunity for a meaningful hearing, including oral argument, as is required by Maryland Law.

92. Defendant Nalley knowingly acted to place the minor child in an environment with drugs,

foul language, and verbal abuse. Defendant Nalley knowingly placed Plaintiff’s son in an environment that was harmful to his health and against the child’s physician’s advice.

93. Plaintiff believes and is informed and therefore avers Defendant Nalley conspired with

Defendant Olmsted and Defendant Bragunier to predetermine the outcome of his matrimonial case to favor Defendant Blake, depriving him of due process, and equal protection of the law, and the companionship of his son, Joshua.

94. Defendant Nalley acted maliciously denying Plaintiff his rights, knowing that his actions

would cause Plaintiff extreme pain of mind.

95. Defendant Patricia Drummond was retained by Plaintiff for the purpose of zealous and

competent representation of him in the matter Roginsky v Roginsky, CV97-780 and CV97-852 in the Circuit Court for Charles County, Maryland.

96. Defendant Drummond told Plaintiff that Defendant Bragunier’s note in his files was

Inappropriate and warranted intervention by the Judicial Disability Commission.

97. Defendant Drummond told Plaintiff that Defendant Olmsted grew up around Defendant

Nalley, who was a close friend of Frank Olmsted, Esquire, Defendant Olmsted’s father.

98. Defendant Drummond told Plaintiff that the La Plata courthouse was an inbred place

where the insider attorneys received preferential treatment, especially from Defendant Nalley, and that she was working hard to establish a better relationship with Defendant Nalley because she intended to move her business to Charles County.

99. Defendant Drummond repeatedly assured Plaintiff that she would

a) ask Defendant Nalley to recuse himself;

b) Pursue aggressive discovery against Defendant Blake;

c) Seek appointment of a guardian ad litem for Plaintiff’s minor, Joshua Roginsky, from a county other than Charles County, where, she alleged, the legal community is strongly inbred and sycophantic toward Defendant Nalley and where Defendant Olmsted and his father, Frank Olmsted, Esquire are the courthouse insiders and Frank Olmsted is an old friend of Defendant Nalley.

d) Do everything in her power to obtain a speedy trial.

100. Defendant Drummond’s promises were made primarily to induce Plaintiff to pay her a

retainer. When Defendant Drummond entered the case she failed to deliver on practically all promises.

101. Defendant Drummond failed to ask Defendant Nalley to recuse himself;

102. Defendant Drummond failed to conduct any discovery for five months and completed

none of it until she was fired one year later;

103. Defendant Drummond told Plaintiff that Defendant Olmsted conducted a personal

vendetta against him and used Defendant Nalley as a weapon against him. She said Defendant Olmsted wanted to punish Plaintiff for having called Defendant Olmsted unscrupulous in his letter to the court. .

104. Defendant Drummond told Plaintiff less than two months after she entered the

case she believed Plaintiff was discriminated against because the Charles County “good ole boys” resented interracial marriages. She refused to be any more specific or clear.

105. A year after Drummond was hired she told Plaintiff that after she entered the case she

learned that Plaintiff being Jewish probably also played a role in his treatment (See Exhibit 15).

106. Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that the marked indifference of Defendants

Nalley and Olmsted to the plight of Joshua is rooted in their racial, ethnic and religious bigotry.

107. Defendant Drummond told Plaintiff she believed that if she zealously represented

Plaintiff she would turn Defendants Nalley and Bragunier against her.

108. Defendant Drummond told Plaintiff that Defendant Nalley was intent on teaching him

a lesson for having called Defendant Olmsted unscrupulous.

109. Defendant Drummond told Plaintiff that Defendant Olmsted spread rumors about him

in the legal community and said Plaintiff could not find another attorney in Charles County who would zealously represent him.

110. Defendant Drummond conspired with Defendants Olmsted, Nalley and Lewis to

fraudulently continue Plaintiff’s December 29, 1997 merits hearing set before Defendant Nalley by seven months in order to give Defendant Blake more time to move out of the crack house and get a job. Defendant Drummond knew of the detrimental effect the continuance would have on Plaintiff’s case and yet she sacrificed the interests of Plaintiff and Joshua for the sake of building a good relationship with the two defendants.

111. Contrary to her original promises, Defendant Drummond acquiesced in the

appointment of John F. Mudd, Esquire as Joshua’s guardian ad litem even though she knew Mr. Mudd is one of the closest friends of Defendant Nalley and Defendant Olmsted’s father and as such was likely to be prejudiced against Plaintiff.

112. In January of 1998 Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Greisman with the

Attorney Grievance Commission, complaining about her late withdrawal from the case, her betrayal of Plaintiff, etc. Within weeks Defendant Drummond informed Plaintiff that Defendant Greisman showed his complaint and her response to it at the courthouse (See Exhibit 27) and that she expected that to damage Plaintiff’s case even further.

113. Defendant Drummond did nothing to demand the recusal of Defendant Nalley after he

engaged her in an ex parte communication regarding Plaintiff during which communication he expressed negative feelings about Plaintiff (See Exhibit 28).

114. Even one year after she was hired Defendant Drummond refused to press Defendants

Olmsted and Blake to produce a response to Plaintiff’s interrogatory which was not even served on Defendant Blake until five months after Defendant Drummond entered the case.

115. In the summer of 1998, weeks before the rescheduled December 29, 1997 merits

hearing, Plaintiff attempted to fire Drummond and to ask for a continuance of the case so that he could complete some discovery. (Unlike in December of 1997, this time the continuance was in Plaintiff’s interest.)

116. Defendant Drummond told Plaintiff she was informed the continuance would be

refused unless he agreed to continue to keep her as his counsel. She promised to promptly conduct the discovery for the next hearing.

117. After three more months nothing changed and Plaintiff fired Drummond.

118. At the July 11, 1997 pendente lite hearing Defendant Olmsted requested the

appointment of a psychologist to evaluate the Roginsky family.

119. Defendant Olmsted knew of the history of psychiatric disorders of Defendant Blake

and that a bona fide psychological evaluation could not benefit his client. The request was made based on the agreement between Defendants Olmsted and Bragunier that the psychologist would “cooperate” with them.

120. Bragunier appointed Defendant Lewis as the evaluator. From the start he established

himself a dishonest and biased person.

121. On information and belief in early November of 1997 Defendant Lewis conducted the

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) test on Defendant Blake, which test showed significant deviations of Defendant Blake psyche from the normal.

122. The MMPI test is part of Defendant Lewis’ and other forensic psychologist’s standard

evaluation procedures. However, in spite of Plaintif’s requests, Defendant Lewis refused to officially conduct it on Plaintiff and Defendant Blake.

123. Defendant Lewis told Plaintiff that Defendant Bragunier’ findings for Defendant

Blake on the custody issue would automatically be incorporated into the merits hearing orders and that his task was only to counsel Plaintiff and Defendant Blake on how to get along following the award of the custody of Joshua to Defendant Blake. This was contrary to the official role of a custody evaluator.

124. Plaintiff asked Defendant Drummond to motion the court for the removal of

Defendant Lewis. In spite of her promises Defendant Drummond never raised the issue of Lewis’ bias with the court. To the contrary, she threatened to withdraw as Plaintiff’s counsel three weeks before the scheduled December 29 merits hearing if Plaintiff did not apologize to Defendant Lewis for having raised questions of Defendant Bragunier undue influence on him. (Defendant Lewis had revealed to Plaintiff that he knew Defendant Bragunier personally and that she and Defendant Greisman were friends.) Plaintiff also learned that Defendant Lewis received a significant portion of his business from Defendant Bragunier.

125. Subsequently, Plaintiff learned that Defendant Lewis’ wife, Barbara Lewis, was a

Friend of Defendant Bragunier and brought her on the board of directors of a small company, Charles County Arts Alliance, where she was the executive director. The Arts Alliance distributed government funds to the county music and arts groups. On information and belief, Barbara Lewis engaged in questionable activities while on the board of directors of the arts alliance and transferred government funds into the account of her group, Creative Endeavors. On information and belief, Defendant Bragunier helped endorse some of the illegal transfers. Plaintiff also learned that in the winter of 1997-1998 Barbara Lewis was forced to resign from the alliance amidst a growing financial scandal and that Defendant Bragunier left the board of directors at approximately the same time.

126. Defendant Lewis was biased by his wife’s friendship with Defendant Bragunier and

the inordinate amount of business he received from Defendant Bragunier.

127. In December of 1997 Defendant Lewis conspired with Defe