CIRCUIT COURT
FOR
CHARLES COUNTY MARYLAND
CASE NO. 08-C-97-000 780
)
VERONICA BLAKE, )
Plaintiff )
) CONSOLIDATED
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
vs. ) MOTIONS FOR RECUSAL AND REMOVAL
)
JACOB ROGINSKY, )
Defendant )
)
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that a judge is disqualified
in any case in which his or her partiality is reasonably questioned on the
basis of personal misconduct. Surrat
v. Prince George’s County, 320 M.D. 439, 578 A2d 745 (1990)
Applying a similar standard, the Court of Appeals has held that a judge
should recuse himself on his own motion, to avoid the appearance of
impropriety. In Re: Turney, 311
M.D. 246, 533 A2d 916 (1987). Based on
the facts outlined in the accompanied Affidavit, the appearance of impropriety
in this case is overwhelming and requires both the recusal of Judge Robert C.
Nalley and the transfer of this case out of the Circuit.
It would be appropriate to transfer this
matter to a new Judge and another Circuit where the parties have never
litigated before, whereby are completely unknown to the Court and where they,
as total strangers to the bench can present their respective arguments free of
the past controversies that have followed this litigation.
The power
of a court to transfer a pending case derived from three
sources – common law, Article IV, § 8 of the Maryland
Constitution, and statute. The common
law authority was noted in Cooke v. Cooke, 41 Md. 362, 366 (1875): "The
power of the courts to remove a cause to an adjoining county for trial, when
justice required it, existed at common law as an acknowledged, if not an
essential part of their ordinary common law jurisdiction." ... In Negro Jerry v. Townshend, 2 Md. 274, 278
(1852), the Court suggested that this common law right or authority was like
"[a]ll laws for the removal of causes from one vicinage to another,
[which] were passed for the purpose of promoting the ends of justice by getting
rid of the influence of some local prejudice which might be supposed to operate
detrimentally to the interests and rights of one or the other of the parties to
the suit." (See Lennox v.
Mull, 89 Md.App. 555, 561, 598 A.2d 847 (1991).)
As the
Affidavit of the defendant indicates, there has been a history of events in
this Circuit before Judge Nalley that raise troubling questions as to the
fundamental fairness of the proceedings.
Many of these events were never addressed at the trial level and were
therefore not part of the record available for inspection to the Maryland
Special Court of Appeals.
Given
the standards enumerated in the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct, Judge
Nalley’s failure to disqualify himself by the time this motion has been filed will
constitute abuse of judicial discretion and will taint these proceedings.
Under
Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 C(1)(a), the general rule that a
judge should not participate in a proceeding in which his or her impartiality
might reasonably be questioned applies where the judge has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party.
Because Judge Nalley exhibited bias
against the defendant in the past, it is highly improbable that this judge has
no particular feelings about him now.
Because
the defendant has sued Judge Nalley, it is highly improbable that this Judge
has no particular feelings about him.
Because
Judge Nalley’s conduct concerning his presiding over ex parte
proceedings was brought by the defendant to the Special Court of Appeals, it is
again highly improbable that Judge Nalley’s views of the defendant were
unchanged by this.
Because
Judge Nalley’s conduct is subject of the current federal suit and federal
appeal, it is improbable that Judge Nalley’s feelings toward the defendant
would be neutral.
Rule
1232, Canon 3 C, MD Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that the appearance of
impropriety ought to be avoided. The
test to be applied is an objective one,
which assumes that a reasonable person knows and understands all the relevant
facts. Like all legal issues, judges
determine appearance of impropriety not by what a straw poll of the only partly
informed man - in the street would show, but by examining the record facts and
the law, and then deciding whether a reasonable person knowing and
understanding all the relevant facts would recuse the Judge. Jefferson-El v. State of Maryland,
330 MD 99 (1993).
No
reasonable person, reviewing the record of the defendant’s encounters in this
litigation would believe that Judge Nalley is impartial or that the appearance
of impropriety does not exist in this matter.
The Court
Should Take Judicial Notice
The attached copies of the defendant’s February 2004
federal complaint (Exhibit
"A") and the subsequent Fourth Federal Circuit appellate
brief (Exhibit "B")
speak to egregious abuses of defendant’s rights by Judge Nalley, in proceedings
that are contrary to fundamental due process.
The federal suit seeks, accordingly, to set aside as void the divorce/custody decree in the
above-captioned case. At issue on
appeal is whether the federal courts are devoid of jurisdiction by the Domestic
Relations Exception from entertaining actions to set aside void judgments in
domestic cases. The 6th
Circuit ruled that the federal courts have such jurisdiction. See Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 287-290, 293-95 &fn.8 (6th
Cir.1998). The prevailing party in that
case, Robert S. Catz, happens to be the defendant’s appellate attorney in the 4th
Circuit. Should the 4th
Circuit disagree with the 6th Circuit, the defendant will file the
action in Maryland. It will,
therefore, be appropriate for the defendant to seek a stay of the proceedings
in this case pending the resolution of the suit to set aside the
divorce/custody decree. The decision on
whether the stay is appropriate must rest on the determination by the court as
to the strength of evidence that the decree is void. Article IV, Sec. 7 of the Maryland Constitution provides in part, "No Judge
shall sit in any case wherein he may be interested ... ." But Judge Nalley naturally has an interest
in the judicial findings as to whether there is sufficient appearance that he,
among others, so fundamentally denied the defendant due process that the
divorce/custody decree issued by him is likely to be adjudged void. Therefore, Judge Nalley may not properly
sit in judgment of this issue, nor should other judges of the Circuit Court For
Charles County, who report to Judge Nalley in his administrative capacity,
adjudicate it.
For these reasons, Judge Nalley should now disqualify
himself and move the case to another circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
Jacob Roginsky, Defendant Pro-Se
P.O. Box 1209
Dahlgren, VA
22448
CIRCUIT COURT
FOR
CHARLES COUNTY MARYLAND
CASE NO. 08-C-97-000 780
)
VERONICA BLAKE, )
Plaintiff )
)
vs. ) MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE
)
JACOB ROGINSKY, )
Defendant )
)
Now comes the defendant and
moves that there be a change of venue in the above captioned proceeding to
outside of this Circuit, for good reason as stated in the Consolidated Brief
and Affidavit.
Respectfully submitted,
Jacob Roginsky, Defendant Pro Se
P.O. Box 1209
Dahlgren, VA
22448
CIRCUIT COURT
FOR
CHARLES COUNTY MARYLAND
CASE NO. 08-C-97-000 780
)
VERONICA BLAKE, )
Plaintiff )
)
vs. ) MOTION FOR RECUSAL
)
JACOB ROGINSKY, )
Defendant )
)
Now comes the defendant and
moves that Hon. Robert Nalley recuse himself from any proceedings concerning
Jacob and Joshua Roginsky for good reason as stated in the accompanying
Consolidated Brief and Affidavit
Respectfully submitted,
Jacob Roginsky, Defendant Pro-Se
P.O. Box 1209
Dahlgren, VA 22448
CIRCUIT COURT
FOR
CHARLES COUNTY MARYLAND
CASE NO. 08-C-97-000 780
)
VERONICA BLAKE, )
Plaintiff )
)
vs. ) AFFIDAVIT OF JACOB ROGINSKY
)
JACOB ROGINSKY, )
Defendant )
)
I, Jacob Roginsky, being duly sworn and on oath,
hereby do attest to the following:
1. I am
the defendant in the above-captioned proceeding.
2. I have
a residence at 17060 12th Street, Dahlgren, VA 22448.
3. In the
course of my domestic relations litigation with Veronica Blake, Judge Nalley
has repeatedly demonstrated that he is not impartial and is willing to surpass
the boundaries of fair adjudication in the following ways:
(i.) The
plaintiff has repeatedly boasted to me
that her lawyer could influence this court.
Ordinarily, I would not take this seriously, except that the unfolding
events repeatedly indicated this to be so.
(ii.) A
note, styled as "Memorandum," was placed in my case file by Hon. Amy
Bragunier, directing that Judge Nalley to have control of the evaluation of my
Exceptions to her findings in the pendente lite hearings of July-August of
1997. (See Exhibit "C")
(iii.) Upon
investigation and information from a circuit court clerk, a clerk from the
masters’ office and my past attorney, Patricia Nimmerichter-Drummond, I learned
that this was contrary to the court rules at the Circuit Court for Charles
County, which required that the review of the exceptions was the responsibility
of the Chambers’s Judge for that week.
The irregular nature of the "Memorandum" was further
highlighter by the fact that it was not entered into the Case History (See Exhibit "D")
which is supposed to reflect all official transactions in the case.
(iv.) I wrote
to Hon. Amy Bragunier asking for explanations as to why she placed the
note. (See Page 1 of Exhibit "E")
(v.) Hon.
Bragunier did not respond. Instead,
Judge Nalley wrote to me, saying, among other (see Page 2 of Exhibit "E"),
I have to assume that Master Bragunier was acting in
compliance with
general and specific instructions from me. I have
directed the Assignment Office to refer all exceptions filings to me for review
in order that I can dispose of them procedurally, give instructions regarding
the scheduling of hearings or refer them to another judge.
(vi.) This was
a misrepresentation: a) The court
rules assigned responsibility of the review of exceptions to the chamber judges
– no referrals from Judge Nalley would
be appropriate; b) My review of all
files of the litigants whose hearings before Master Bragunier took place the
day of my hearing or during the two weeks around that date turned up no similar
notes from Master Bragunier; c) The
masters’ office clerk, who apparently
found my treatment by Master Bragunier appalling, informed me that my
case was treated differently; d)
Attorney Drummond told me that the opposing counsel, William Olmsted, had
special access to Judge Nalley, had arranged for the case to go before the
judge and that the local legal community knew that Olmsted spoke badly of me to
Judge Nalley and that Judge Nalley allegedly promised to"teach me a
lesson," making her afraid that
representing me would turn the judge against her and her clients.
(vii) The fact that Master Bragunier forwarded my
letter to Judge Nalley for reply is a further evidence that he instructed her
to put the note in my file, indicating he had received ex parte
communications about the case before he officially entered it.
(viii.) The
conduct of the pendente lite hearing by Master Bragunier was marked by her clear
hostility toward me throughout. She
ignored all evidence of abuse, neglect and assaults of my son by the
plaintiff. It was clear to me from
Master Bragunier’s conduct and interaction with Mr. Olmsted that she engaged in
considerable ex parte contacts with him about the case and that her findings
were "sealed" from the start.
She denied me testimony of my witnesses, accepted clear perjury by the
plaintiff, snubbed me on numerous occasions while I presented important
information about the plaintiff’s poor treatment of my son, lack of parental
skills and interest and dishonesty, as well as mental illness.
(ix.) During the second part of the pendente lite
hearing, on August 1, 1997, Master Bragunier stated:
Before we leave today I am going to
give you a merits date for your divorce hearing and you will have that
time. ... in fact, I’ll give you the date right now: December 29, 1997, at 9:30 a.m.
.........................................................................................................................
I am going to recommend that the
Department of Social Services conduct a home study of both parties’ homes prior
to the merits hearing which is scheduled for December 29, 1997, at 9:30 a.m.
before Circuit Court.
.........................................................................................................................
Dr. Lewis will provide a report and
recommendation to the Circuit Court Judge prior to the merits hearing.
(x.) It is clear from the aforementioned
that the merits hearing was set before a circuit court judge for December 29,
1997. This development entailed
serious irregularities :
a) It is the responsibility of
the Assignment Office at the La Plata courthouse to set up merits hearings
before judges and the masters are not involved in this;
b) The master did not ask Mr.
Olmsted if the date and time were acceptable to him and he did not consult his
schedule, suggesting that there were ex parte communications between Master
Bragunier and Mr. Olmsted where the date was discussed;
c) The Case History (see Exhibit
"D") does not reflect that a hearing in the case had been
set for December 29, 1997, as it would be normally, indicating that the
procedure used by Master Bragunier to set the hearing on the merits was further
irregular.
d) A former Masters’ Office
clerk warned me shortly thereafter that Judge Nalley had a personal interest in
my case and that he wanted for the merits hearing to be before him.
(xi.) On
December 23, 1997, Attorneys Olmsted
and Drummond filed a motion for continuance of the case (see Page 1 of Exhibit "F"), which
Judge Nalley approved on December 29, 1997 (see Exhibit "F"). The judge noted on the order that the
hearing was to be set before him. Since
the case had not yet been assigned to him, this was irregular because the court
procedure called for random assignment of judges to hear merits cases.
(xii.) The Motion For Continuance entailed further
irregularities in the handling of my case, with the participation of Judge
Nalley:
a) The psychologist, Dr. Lewis, advised me in early December of 1997
that his report was almost ready and he would submit it to the court well
before the merits hearing and Master Bragunier’s instructions to Dr. Lewis (see Exhibit "G")
anticipated an evaluation that would be completed within two weeks, whereas the
parties already had seen Dr. Lewis for about two months;
b) Master Bragunier announced
at the pendente lite hearing that the merits
hearing was set before a
circuit judge, not master;
c) Attorney Drummond knew for
several months that the case was set before Judge Nalley and apprised me
accordingly;
d) The Masters’ clerk told me that she saw Master Bragunier
setting the hearing before Judge Nalley;
e) Judge Nalley’s docket for
December 29 (See Exhibit
"I") was unusually empty and a clerk told me it looked as
if he had a day-long hearing cancelled that day;
f) It was well known at the
courthouse that the Masters had no
hearings on Mondays, which December 29, 1997 was;
h) My letter to Master
Bragunier (see Exhibit
"H") went unanswered by her.
(xiii.) The hearing was continued by six and a half
months (see 0036000 entry in Exhibit
"D"). This length
of continuance suggested irregularities as well, since my investigation showed
that the Assignment Office had significantly earlier dates availabls. This delay was clearly contrary to my
interests, and was of significant benefit to the plaintiff:
As a Ph.D scientist with strong employment history, a
parent with a good
residence and demonstrated
outstanding parental skills I was favored by Maryland law to become the
custodial parent of my son. The plaintiff
did not work or study, had exceedingly poor record of getting and staying
employed or
pursuing education, and she
lived in a house with documented drug abusers, as well as had significant
issues as a parent, with attested history of child abuse and neglect. The long continuance enabled her to relocate
into government housing, get a part-time job and enroll part-time in a
community college.
(xiv.) Following the January 1998 final
divorce/custody hearing before Judge Nalley, Olmsted had ex parte contact
with Judge Nalley, where Judge Nalley increased the amount of support to the
plaintiff. I had prohibited Olmsted
from discussing this issue with the judge ex parte, and we agreed to
have a three-way call with the judge.
Olmsted then engaged Judge Nalley in ex parte communication, telling me
he had informed Judge Nalley that I objected to any ex parte communications
between them, but that Judge Nalley told him not to mind that and just inform
me later of his decision.
(xv.) Apparently realizing that I would make a
disciplinary complaint, Olmsted filed a fraudulent Memorandum To The Court (See Exhibit "J"),
claiming that I had authorized the ex parte meeting, which memorandum
Judge Nalley accepted, apparently with full knowledge that the memorandum was
fraudulent. This matter was raised at
the appellate level, and it caused a remand on all financial matters in the
case. The Maryland Attorney Grievance
Commission found Olmsted in violation of ethical norms for this conduct.
(xvi.) Attorney Drummond told me repeatedly that
Judge Naley expressed strong dislike of me to local attorneys, based primarily
on his ex parte communications with Olmsted, with whom I had
developed a hostile relationship. Exhibit "K"
is a transcript of a mid February 1998 telephone conversation between Attorney
Drummond and me. (At that time I
already knew that she was determined to be on good terms with Judge Nalley and
accordingly sacrificed my interests altogether.)
(xvii.) If Attorney Drummond’s representations as
reflected in Exhibit
"K" are true, the transcript is further evidence of Judge
Nalley’s acceptance of ex parte communications with attorneys, even
those whom he knows relatively little, as Drummond.
(xviii.) If Drummond’s representations, as reflected
in Exhibit "K",
are true, the transcript is further evidence of Judge Nalley’s hostility toward
me, which predates his official entry into my case, and which is apparently
based on his ex parte communications.
(xix.) Judge Nalley assisted the court appointed
psychologist, Dr. James E. Lewis, much of whose business comes from the Circuit
Court for Charles County, to evade testifying at the divorce/custody hearings
about the truthfulness of his report and session notes, by a) failing to notify
me of the letter Dr. Lewis wrote to Judge Nalley, advising him that he
allegedly was unable to comply with my subpoena to testify at the first merits
hearing and b) foreclosing my ability to subpoena Dr. Lewis for the second part
of the hearing.
(xx.) Judge Nalley assisted Dr. Lewis to avoid
testifying at the merits hearings in spite of my having informed the court that
Dr. Lewis’ report was fraudulent and that he fabricated his session notes after
I subpoenaed them. I informed the
court that the notes for the sessions were a collage of statements from other
sessions, "conversations" and "statements" completely
invented by Dr. Lewis, and statements that were perverted by him, e.g. where my
son twice told Dr. Lewis that he wanted to live with me, but Dr. Lewis reported
in the notes that my son said he wanted to live with the plaintiff . The court had an insane note from the
plaintiff, "recommending" that my son’s mouth be closed with band aid
at night to force him to breath through his nose(!), and the court had evidence
that the child had a history of obstructed nasal breathing and sleep
apnea. The court had other evidence
that the plaintiff is mentally disturbed and that Dr. Lewis is commits fraud,
e.g. billing me and my insurance company for sessions of therapy of the parties
for "adjustment reaction."
(xxi.) In spite of
the above information, Judge Nalley accepted Dr. Lewis’ report without allowing
me to obtain his testimony.
(xxii.) Judge Nalley consistently denied me valuable
litigation tools:
a) According
to a court reporter, Judge Nalley prohibited him from working on the requested
by me transcript of a proceeding that I needed for the hearings before Master
Bragunier;
b) On
3/27/02 Judge Nalley denied my motion to compel deposition of the plaintiff for
the 4/02/02 Contempt Of Court hearing (regarding the denial to me by her of my
court-ordered time with my son);
c) Judge Nalley repeatedly denied me testimony of
individuals with knowledge of extrinsic
fraud in my case, e.g. Attorney Greisman and Doctor Lewis,
d) At the 4/02/02 hearing to hold the
plaintiff in contempt for denying me my Winter Break time with my son, Judge
Nalley denied me my right to impeach the plaintiff’s credibility by presenting overwhelming evidence of her
past contradictory and proven otherwise untrue statements.
e) At the
12/17/02 Emergency Show Cause hearing in connection with the plaintiff’s
malicious termination of telephone contact between my son and me – in violation
of this court’s specific orders issued at the 4/2/02 hearing (which was also in
connection with the plaintiff’s malicious violation of the court ordered contact between my son and me)
– Judge Nalley threatened me that if I
insisted on testifying and questioning the plaintiff about her conduct he would
punish both parties. – Utter outrage!
(xxiii.) Judge Nalley has abused his discretion in
accepting the plaintiff as a more credible witness than I and my witnesses,
even as he has denied me to present at the 4/02/02 hearing overwhelming
evidence of her past misrepresentations under oath. Incredibly, at the same hearing Judge Nalley declared that the plaintiff in his opinion was never
untruthful in court. A mountain of
evidence of plaintiff’s exceptional propensity to lie under oath had been
demonstrated to the judge, e.g.
a) that she falsely accused me
of coercing her to sign the separation agreement under the threat that she
could not attend her father’s funeral in Jamaica otherwise – the funeral
happened three months (!) prior to the signing of the separation agreement – or
b) filing a fraudulent
petition for protection from domestic abuse, on which she had lost in court,
claiming that she tape-recorded me threatening to kill her, only to say in
court that her tape ran out before the alleged threats, or
c) the numerous inconsistent
statements she made about her history of employment and education and
d) the history of her parental
negligence.
The reality and manner of Judge Nalley’s blatant
misrepresentation as to the history of
the plaintiff’s untruthful statements under oath would
be in and of itself powerful
evidence of bias and animosity on the part of Judge
Nalley against me in the eyes of a
reasonable observer.
(xxiv.) I found it necessary to sue Judge Nalley in federal court in
February of 2000 under Title 42 U.S. Code Section 1983 (See Exhibit "M") because he
violated my rights to due process and equal protection of the law. The case was filed in the Southern Division
of the Federal District Court For The District of Maryland.
(xxv.) At the 2/10/2000 hearing on remand from the
Maryland Special Court of Appeals I informed Judge Nalley that he was a
defendant in the federal case, which I believe he already knew from Attorney
Olmsted, who was also a defendant in the same suit. I asked Judge Nalley to recuse himself. He refused.
(xxvi.) Despite my having sued Judge Nalley, he
proceeded with the hearing, but issued his decision nearly six months
later(!). Judging from the stamp on the
envelope, he signed his order two days
after the federal suit was dismissed, although the date written on the order
suggested that it was signed two days prior to the dismissal. I believe that Judge Nalley backdated the
order to cover up the fact that his ruling was contingent upon the disposition
of the federal case.
(xxvii) Judge Nalley has made financial awards to the
plaintiff that are objectively contrary to law:
a) At the merits hearing he
awarded the plaintiff indefinite alimony, even though the marriage was short,
the plaintiff was relatively young and the court did not find that the
plaintiff suffered from any impairments.
A sophisticated and experienced in domestic litigation judge, such as
Judge Nalley, must have known that the award was contrary to law, as the
Special Court of Appeals later stated in its opinion.
b) The evidence in the case is overwhelming that no marital assets
were generated during the short marriage – my marriage assets were depleted by
the irresponsible and lazy plaintiff – yet Judge Nalley awarded the plaintiff
first $20,000, initially, and $27,500
following the February of 2000 hearing on remand. I believe this was a deliberate violation of the applicable
Maryland law by Judge Nalley.
c) After a bankruptcy court
discharged said award, Judge Nalley re-awarded it to the plaintiff, saying that
the discharged award was not final because it was being appealed – it could not
have been unknown to Judge that with a few exceptions only final judgments are
appealable. The Maryland Special Court of
Appeals overruled this award.
(xxviii.) I learned that despite a random judicial
assignment system at the Court, a dispro-portionately high percentage of cases
involving William Olmstead were assigned to Judge Nalley. As a theoretical physicist, I have had
ample training in statistical analysis and qualify as a learned person in the
subject of probability and statistics.
(xxix.) At the end of 1998 I obtained a listing of all the civil cases
that William Olmsted had had at the Circuit Court for Charles County in the
years 1996-1998. I learned that a
disproportional number of his contested – as opposed to settled – cases had
final hearings before Judge Nalley. (See page 1, of Exhibit
"L")
(xxx.) I calculated the mathematical odds of such
a disparity (see page 2, Exhibit
"L") to be less than 0.01%, if no account was taken of
the depressed numbers for Judges Chappelle and Clark, but smaller by orders of
magnitude if said account was made.
This is a powerful probabilistic statement in support of my proposition
that Attorney Olmsted enjoys and inappropriate professional relationship with
Judge Nalley.
(xxxi) The courtroom dynamics between Judge Nalley
and Willliam Olmsted suggested significant ex parte communications between
them. On a number of occasions Judge
Nalley exhibited knowledge of
issues in my case that had not been discussed in the courtroom, but were discussed between me and Mr. Olmsted. For example, at the merits hearing Judge
Nalley defended the plaintiff regarding her decision to put my son through tonsillectomy,
against the advice of his pediatrician and ear-nose-throat doctor:
THE COURT: Mr. Roginsky, for what it's worth, I had my tonsils out at age five. That's because in 1949 and thereabouts, it was the general practice in this country to take out tonsils
and adenoids when
the kid had a sore throat early in the game. I have a daughter who is almost
19. My wife and I have argued for -- or
did argue for the better part of ten years over whether or not the doctor who
refused to take her or to sanction the removal of her tonsils and adenoids each
winter as she had strep infections was a quack or not. She never had them removed and she has
permanent aftereffects of the constant strep infections. I'm prepared to notice
judicially that there is a medical debate in this country over whether or not
this kind of surgery ought to occur early on.
I happen to think the side of the argument that says you don't do the
surgery unless you absolutely have to is dead wrong because I never had the
kind of infections my daughter had and I suspect that I didn't in large part
because they took the damn things out early on. I don't know, but it's
certainly not a reflection on parentalinterest or concern or competence.
However, there had been no discussion of this decision
in the courtroom. I did, nevertheless,
had extensive exchange about this with Mr. Olmsted for several days prior to
the merits court hearing and even told Mr. Olmsted that I would sue him if my
son had the unneeded operation.
(xxxii) I believe the dynamics of the interaction
between Judge Nalley and Mr. Olmsted speaks to their close familiarity, which
would not otherwise be necessarily a cause for concern, except in the context
of my other experiences with both. The
manner of communication in the following excerpt from the January 29, 1999
hearing suggests that Judge Nalley and "Bill" interact in informal
settings outside of the court:
MR. OLMSTED: It's right underneath the Beltsville house. In fact, Your Honor, on the Beltsville house I think we put also in there what Mr. Roginsky recalled at that time to be the downpayment when he purchased the house.
THE COURT: I'm doing
three things at once, Bill, just a second.
(xxxiii.) While searching for an attorney in Prince
George’s County in the summer of 2002 I was referred to Attorney Rothstein, who
told me that he had heard of me and of Judge Nalley’s strong dislike of me,
saying he could not represent me because it would likely damage his friendship
with Judge Nalley.
(xxxiv) I had heard similar warnings from other
attorneys practicing law in Charles County, who said that Judge Nalley made it
known that he intensely dislikes me and
that they would not represent me for fear of Judge Nalley’s reaction. Attorney Drummond had repeatedly told me
of her fear that Judge Nalley would take it out on her and her clients if she
were to vigorously represent me.
(xxxv.) I made all of the allegations contained in
this affidavit regarding Attorney Drummond and William Olmsted in my federal
complaint (see Exhibit
"M") that had William Olmsted and Patricia Drummond as
defendants.
(xxxvi.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d) provides:
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading
is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not
denied in the responsive pleading.
Neither Drummond nor Olmsted
disputed (see Exhibits "N",
"O") my claims.
(xxxvii.) On August 9, 2004 I was served with process concerning the
plaintiff’s Motion to relocate to Florida.
She had threatened me repeatedly that she would do this if I filed a
federal suit. She has carried through
on her illegal threat. Her Motion to
Relocate is fraudulent and she refused to answer questions at the deposition
that I held on August 25, 2004 regarding this motion. On September 2, 2004 I filed a Motion to Compel Deposition,
which is with Judge Nalley at this time, 25 days later, even though he could
rule immediately, sua sponte, and order
the plaintiff to complete the deposition.
I believe Judge Nalley is deliberately delaying his ruling and intends
to deny my Motion To Compel Deposition – as he did before the April 4, 2002
hearing – leaving me no time for
discovery regarding the plaintiff’s motion to relocate to Florida with my son.
4. Judge Nalley’s pervasive presence and influence
in Charles County stretches over decades.
He is the Chief Judge of The Circuit Court of Charles County. It is unlikely that due to the small size
of the local legal community and Judge Nalley’s powerful position in the Circuit Court that any local Judge would
be free of influence by him.
5. I have had difficulty in locating
counsel in Charles County to represent me.
6. The combination of the facts of a) an
illegal note placed in my file, b) substantial proof of pervasive ex parte communications
regarding me that involved, c) the every-step-of-the-way denial to me of due
process by Judge Nalley and the high improbability of the above distribution in
an unbiased judicial assignment setting can leave no objective observer with
reasonable expectation that the judicial process to which I will be subjected
in Judge Nalley’s court will be fair.
7. There is no manner in which I can feel comfortable in a
courtroom of Judge Nalley or in this Circuit given the history of my treatment
by the judge and the momentous judicial decisions that will have to be made in
the near future regarding my son, the affect on whom of Judge Nalley’s conduct
is yet the biggest story to be told.
Signed this _____day of
_________________2004 under oath
___________________________
Jacob Roginsky, Defendant Pro Se
P.O. Box 1209
Dahlgren, VA
22448
I, Jacob Roginsky, certify that copies of the foregoing Motion For Change of Venue, Motion for Recusal, Consolidated Brief In Support Of Motions for Recusal and Removal and Affidavit of Jacob Roginsky were mailed by certified mail on September ______, 2004 to the Plaintiff, Veronica Blake, at 3002 Gallery Place, Apt. 14, Waldorf, Maryland, 20603.
_____________________ __________
Jacob Roginsky Date